





























DISSERTATIONES MATHEMATICAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
92 
 














Deriving Security Requirements from 






















Institute of Computer Science, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Sci-
ence, University of Tartu, Estonia.
Dissertation has been accepted for the commencement of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) on October 31, 2014, by the Council of the
Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu.
Supervisors:
Assoc. Prof. PhD. Raimundas Matulevičius
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Abstract
The past couple of decades have seen enterprises deploy increasingly so-
phisticated methods for supporting their business processes by means of
information systems. Moreover, given the dynamic business environment
that the digital economy has brought about, enterprises need to continu-
ously evolve their business processes and supporting information systems
in order to cope with market changes and to take advantage of technology
innovations. This confluence of factors has heightened the need for e -
cient and reliable approaches to identify security objectives for information
systems and to map these objectives into security requirements.
Existing methods for security requirements analysis in information sys-
tems focus on eliciting security objectives and requirements at the level of
individual functions. However, the complexity and rate of change of mod-
ern business processes requires a more holistic approach, wherein security
objectives and requirements are elicited at the level of end-to-end processes.
In this setting, this thesis presents and evaluates a method for deriving
security objectives and requirements from business process models. The
thesis starts by proposing an alignment between concepts from security risk
management and business process modeling concepts. From this analysis, a
set of security risk-oriented patterns is developed to facilitate the elicitation
of security objectives from business process models. These security patterns
are classified via a taxonomy that helps analysts to apply these patterns in
business process models.
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These contributions form a foundation for a method called SREBP
Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes. The method
facilitates early security analysis by eliciting the security objectives from
business process models and their systematic translation to security re-
quirements. The SREBP method is validated on a case study within the
Estonian Genome Centre. The results show that the SREBP method im-
proves security requirements elicitation from business process models.
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Sécurité
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As enterprises rely on their information systems to perform their business activi-
ties, the security concerns also grow to execute these business processes securely.
A study from a business process magazine [Harm 10] states that more than 70%
of business processes are deployed on information systems that are responsible for
executing their business functions. Nowadays, enterprises operate in such an en-
vironment that requires flexible adoption of their systems to the dynamic changes
and their easier integration of external resources. These challenging demands have
increased the security needs of an enterprise [Bohr 13]. Furthermore, the nature
of inherent risks lies in the routine operations and interactions with stakehold-
ers, this makes the enterprises vulnerable to potential security risks. In today’s
business, the security of information systems is not only restricted to secure en-
terprise’s assets from harm; but the enterprises must comply to the international
security standards and also guarantee that these standards are strictly followed in
executing their processes. At least the system should detect the occurences of any
violation [Hamm 07, Bohr 13]. These assurances are required in today’s business
environment to develop a certain kind of trust with the business partners; otherwise
no business transaction would take place at all [Tsia 05, Smit 14]. In [Schn 09],
Schneier mentioned that a security is not a single product that can be added to
the system and make it secure. Instead, it is a thorough process that analyses the
enterprise’s security needs, defines policies, implements the countermeasures, their
validation, and reviews them periodically.
It is widely recognised that an insecure execution of enterprise’s business pro-
cesses can have devastated consequences [Acco 13]. The need for executing the
enterprise’s business processes is rising steadily. This trend demands a systematic
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approach to determine the enterprise security needs for their information system,
and their translation to security requirements that support the secure execution of
their business processes. To consider this need, the approach taken in this thesis is
to analyse the business processes from a security perspective. The analyses iden-
tify the enterprise’s assets, determine their security objectives, and elicit security
requirements to ensure their security during the execution of business process.
1.1 Problem Statement
Security engineering plays an important role to lower the risk of intentional harm
to valuable assets to an acceptable level by preventing and reacting to malicious
harm, misuse, threats and security risks [Fire 07]. Although the importance of
introducing security engineering practices early in the development cycle has been
acknowledged [Sind 05, Jurj 05], it has been oversighted in business processes and
targets the improvement of business functions. The reason behind is that the
business analysts are experts in their domain but having no clue about the secu-
rity domain [Rodr 07]. There have been several attempts to engage the relatively
matured security requirements engineering in business processes. However, the
majority of studies either focuss on the graphical representation of security as-
pects in business process models [Menz 09, Mull 11, Pavl 08, Rodr 07] or enforce
the security mechanisms [Herr 06, Wolt 09] or both [Mona 12, Rohr 04]. These
studies have neglected the security requirements elicitation. The major problems
in addressing security engineering in business process modelling are the following:
firstly, the security requirements are specified in terms of security architectural
design (i.e., security control) and missing the rationale about the trade-o↵s of the
security decision; secondly, the requirements elicitation is either missing or hap-
hazard that leads to miss some critical security requirements; and finally, due to
the dynamic and complicated nature of business processes the studies only address
varying aspects (i.e., authorization, access control, separation of duty or binding
of duty) but not the overall security of business processes. These problems can
be overcome by eliciting security objectives from the organizational business pro-
cesses and by transforming them to the security requirements of the operational
business processes where the technology supports the business processes execution.
The thesis aimed at integrating security in business processes to facilitate business
analyst in eliciting security requirements from business process models.
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1.2 Scope of the work
This work stands in the business-process-security domain. In this section, we
define the concepts and the boundaries of the thesis work.
1.2.1 Business Processes
Business processes have several definitions [ENV 95, Verg 08, Duma 13] in the
literature. The definition of business processes related to the domain applied in
the thesis is provided by Weske [Wesk 12] “a business process consists of a set of
activities that are performed in coordination in an organisational and technical
environment. These activities jointly realise a business goal.”The domain of this
thesis encompasses not only the activities within an enterprise whose execution
is supported by the information system or its architecture, but also takes care of
individuals and business partners coordinating with an enterprise’s information
system to achieve the business goals of enterprise. For means of this thesis, we
use an artefact, business process model, to describe business processes. The thesis
uses Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) Version 2.0 as a modelling
language. However, contributions (described in Section 1.3) are independent of
any modelling language and are applicable to any ways of describing a business
process.
1.2.2 Security Risk Management
A security approach used in this thesis is security-risk based. Therefore, the do-
main comprised of both the security and risk management. In the literature,
security is understood in two di↵erent ways [Maye 09]. Firstly, the approaches
[Fire 03a] that concern with deliberate harm on the information systems use the
term security. Secondly, the approaches that concern with accidental harm to the
information systems use the term safety. Similarly, another study [Fire 07] con-
siders a broader notion that covers both the security and safety under the term
defensibility. The notion of security that we adopt in this thesis, and that defines
the scope, is the deliberate or intentional harm to the information systems.
There exist several definitions of risk in di↵erent standards. We adapted the
domain model [Dubo 10, Maye 09] for information systems security risk manage-
ment (ISSRM). In the ISSRM domain model (see Section 2.2.1), risk is defined as a
combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a negative im-
pact harming one or more of the assets. In this work, negative impact is considered
in terms of information system’s functionality that it could not able to provide in
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the event of a successful attack rather than evaluating the monetary impact of risk
on the asset. Similarly, risk management is defined as coordinated activities to
direct and control an enterprise with regard to risk [ISOI 02]. In an enterprise, the
risk management can address various kinds of issues [The 01, ISO 04] related to
their enterprise’s management (e.g., illness of a key person), finance (e.g., related
to investment), environment (e.g., pollution), or security. The risk management
in this thesis includes only those risks that are in the context of an information
system related to the enterprise’s business process execution.
Thus, the security risk management adopted in this thesis is defined as the
coordinated activities to direct, prevent and control the risks, to an enterprise,
caused deliberately by an insider or outsider to harm the enterprise asset(s) during
the execution of their business processes.
1.3 Contribution and Research Questions
The thesis contribution aims at proposing a method for security requirements
elicitation from business processes that enable business analysts to understand the
security needs and define security requirements for their system-to-be. This thesis
focusses on aligning modelling languages used in security engineering domain and
business processes modelling. More specifically, the research question addressed
in this thesis is:
How to identify assets and their security criteria in the enterprise’s business
processes, and to elicit security requirements for the information system in order
to protect these assets?
The answer to this research question comprises of the following contributions
proposed in this thesis. First, a set of security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 14b]
are developed to systematically integrate the security requirements into a business
process. The contribution started by investigating the overlaps between security
engineering and business process modelling. The investigation results in aligning
the constructs in business process modelling language with the key concepts of
security domain and identifies the shortcoming of business process modelling lan-
guage in expressing security-risk related concepts [Altu 12]. The alignment gives
a grounded and fine-grained reasoning for extending the business process mod-
elling language to address these limitations. These extensions [Altu 13] are used
in security risk-oriented patterns to express business assets and their security cri-
teria, potential security risks, and their countermeasures. The security patterns
facilitate the elicitation of security concerns by identifying assets from business
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processes and determine their security objectives, followed by risk analysis that
introduces security rationale and identifies the security requirements as constraints
on assets. The idea is to facilitate business analysts by reusing solutions already
implemented independently or to elicit di↵erent aspects of similar problems.
Second, considering that the number of patterns can grow that raises the im-
portance of classifying these patterns in order to ease the patterns application, a
taxonomy [Ahme 13] of business process security is proposed to define a process-
oriented classification scheme for security risk-oriented patterns. The taxonomy
aimed to integrate business process modelling with the security-risk. Further-
more, the taxonomy subsequently identifies the patterns’ potential occurrences in
business processes to facilitate their deployment.
Finally, the above contributions form a sound foundation for a method called
SREBP –Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes– the main
contribution of this thesis [Ahme 15, Ahme 14a]. The method allows early secu-
rity analysis by determining the security objectives from business process models
and their systematic translation to security requirements. The method uses se-
curity patterns to reason the risk analysis and rationale behind the security re-
quirements. These requirements are then described in details using the system’s
contextual areas. On the one hand, it allows business analyst to understand how
to secure business assets, on the other hand, it contributes to the alignment of
business process models with the security domain. The method is validated to
check its completeness and e ciency with respect to its ability in eliciting security
requirements and how it contributes in securing business assets.
1.4 Publications and Contributions
This dissertation is based on four articles whose contributions are listed below.
• Publication 1: Securing Business Processes using Security Risk-oriented
Patterns [Ahme 14b]
– The article proposes a method to introduce security requirements to
the business processes through the collaboration between business and
security analysts. Introducing a set of security risk-oriented patterns
supports the collaboration. The security patterns capture existing,
time-proven solutions in a reusable manner and provide a rationale for
security requirements. The performance of these patterns in identify-
ing business assets, risks, and countermeasures is tested in the business
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models of two business cases. In this paper, I conducted an extensive
literature survey and developed the set of security patterns. Further-
more, I conducted the empirical studies that verified the usefulness of
the proposed security patterns. I was the main author of this paper.
• Publication 2: A Taxonomy for Assessing Security in Business Process
Modelling [Ahme 13]
– The article proposes a comprehensive three-dimensional taxonomy for
assessing security in business processes. It includes an in-depth insight
of existing taxonomies used to classify business processes and security.
The proposed taxonomy is subsequently used to classify a set of secu-
rity risk-oriented patterns and identify their potential occurrences to
deploy these security patterns in business processes. The taxonomy
also defines a way of integrating security in business processes. The
application of taxonomy is illustrated using an illustrative example.
In this paper that I am the main author of, I performed an extensive
literature survey, from which I derived and proposed a taxonomy for
assessing security in business process models. In addition, I applied
the taxonomy on an illustrative example for the purpose of validation.
• Publication 3: Eliciting Security Requirements from the Business Pro-
cesses using Security Risk-oriented Patterns [Matu 13]
– In this article, we refine the security requirements presented in security
risk-oriented patterns and generate a security requirements model from
a business process model. The article analyses the pattern, namely se-
curing confidential data using access control, and defines the RBAC
security model. The approach presented in this paper can be used
to develop security requirements models for the remaining security
risk-oriented patterns. For this paper, I performed the security re-
quirements elicitation and developed a security model in RBAC.
• Publication 4: Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes
(SREBP) [Ahme 15]
– In this article, we use the security risk-oriented patterns to understand
what business assets need to be secured, and to develop the security re-
quirements elicitation from business processes (SREBP) method. The
method supports elicitation of the security objectives and their sys-
tematic translation to detailed security requirements within the oper-
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ational business processes. The method is applied and validated in the
Estonian Genome Centre using a case study. In this paper, of which I
am the primary author, I investigated the use of security risk-oriented
patterns, and I developed a method –security requirements elicitation
from business processes (SREBP). I applied SREBP method and em-
pirically validated its completeness and e ciency compare to that of
the SQUARE method. I was the one responsible for the design and
execution of Genome Centre case study.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
An overview of the thesis structure is as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides background information and introduces work related
to the main topics of this thesis, particularly business processes, security
risk management and model-driven security. Each of these domains starts
by introducing their concepts in a general manner and then followed by a
discussion of approaches presented in each domain.
• Chapter 3 corresponds to the publication “Securing Business Processes us-
ing Security Risk-oriented Patterns”. The chapter identifies the problems of
addressing security in business process models and proposes a set of security
risk-oriented patterns. The chapter illustrates how patterns enable the iden-
tification of security assets, their potential security risks and corresponding
security requirements in business processes.
• Chapter 4 corresponds to the publication “A Taxonomy for Assessing Se-
curity in Business Process Modelling”. The chapter presents a taxonomy
that integrates business process modelling with the security criteria aimed
to define a process-oriented classification scheme for security risk-oriented
patterns. The chapter illustrates the application of proposed taxonomy by
classifying security patterns according to the taxonomy’s dimensions; this
enables a systematic security assessment in business processes.
• Chapter 5 corresponds to the publications “Eliciting Security Requirements
from the Business Processes using Security Risk-Oriented Patterns” and
“Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP)”. In
this chapter, we propose a method to systematically elicit security require-
ments from business processes using five contextual areas –access control,
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communication channel, input interface, network infrastructure, and datas-
tore. The method specifies these requirements using security requirements
models and uses the security risk-oriented patterns in each contextual area
to provide a rationale for the requirements. The method is validated to
check its completeness and e ciency against the security quality require-
ments engineering (a.k.a., SQUARE) method.
• Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this thesis and outlines di-




This section introduces the concepts of business processes and security risk man-
agement. After a description of the necessary concepts used in current literature,
then, modelling languages for business processes and security risk are presented.
2.1 Business Processes
In the literature, the term business process is defined as:
• “A process is a specific ordering of work activities across time and place, with
a beginning, an end, and clearly identified inputs and outputs: a structure
for action.” [Dave 93]
• “A business process is an ordered set of enterprise activities which can be ex-
ecuted to realise a given objective of an enterprise or a part of an enterprise
to achieve some business value.” [ENV 95]
• “A set of one or more linked procedures or activities which collectively realise
a business objective or policy goal, normally within the context of an organ-
isational structure defining functional roles and relationships.” [Work 99]
• “A process is the set of activities (repeated steps or tasks) that accomplishes
some business function.” [Cong 11]
• “A collection of inter-related events, activities and decision points that in-
volve a number of actors and objects, and that collectively lead to an outcome
that is of value to at least one customer.” [Duma 13]
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There exist several other definitions, for the means of this thesis we adopt the
one proposed by Weske [Wesk 12]. The business process, there, is defined as “a set
of activities that are performed in coordination in an organisational and technical
environment. These activities jointly realise a business goal. Each business process
is enacted by a single organisation, but it may interact with business processes
performed by other organisations.” [Wesk 12].
Business processes are implemented using an artefact called business process
model [Wesk 12]. A business process model is modelled in an appropriate mod-
elling language that includes the activities, events and decision points, the or-
ganisational resources (users and departments) that perform these activities, the
artefacts that are produced or manipulated, and specifies their relations. The act
of developing these business process models is called business process modelling.
Vergidis et al. [Verg 08] characterise the importance of expressing business pro-
cesses that in the majority of cases, a business process would be expressive and
communicative as the modelling language we have used to model it. Therefore,
the elements and the capabilities of a modelling language are equally significant to
describe and understand the business process. In this thesis, we have used Busi-
ness Process Model and Notation (BPMN) Version 2.0 as a modelling language.
The BPMN is widely adopted as a standard notation for representing business
processes. The main purpose of BPMN models is to facilitate communication be-
tween domain analysts and to support decision-making. However, BPMN models
are also used as a basis for specifying software system requirements, and in such
cases, they are handed over to software developers [Ouya 09].
The concepts, methods and techniques that support the design, administra-
tion, configuration, enactment and analysis of business processes is referred as
business process management (BPM) [Wesk 12]. The Business Process Manage-
ment lifecycle comprises of various phases where a business process can be used
[Wesk 12]. In the design and analysis phase, the processes are identified, and
(re)designed. In the configuration phase, designs are implemented by configur-
ing a process-aware information system (e.g., a WFMS). After configuration, the
enactment phase starts where the operational business processes are executed us-
ing the system configured. In the evaluation phase, the operational processes are
diagnosed to identify problems and to find things that can be improved.
In this thesis, we focus only on the first phase of BPM lifecycle where the aim
is to analyse and (re)design the business process model. The method introduced in
this thesis; i) analyses the business process model and identify the security criteria
for business assets, and ii) elicits security requirements to satisfy these security
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criteria. However, the rest of the phases pursue the execution of business process
models, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The business process model is an abstraction of various details that vary at
di↵erent levels from describing business goals to the technical implementation.
Thus, we characterise a business process model using two aspects, hierarchical
abstraction and perspectives described as follows:
2.1.1 Hierarchical Abstraction
Hierarchical abstraction is a common mechanism to describe abstraction in many
of the existing languages for conceptual modelling [Krog 12]. It gives a better un-
derstanding of complex processes by presenting the required part at each level, and
the modelling languages also include support for hierarchical constructs through-
out the entire modelling and evolution activities [Krog 12]. Krogstie [Krog 12]
describes four standard relations (i.e., classification, aggregation, generalization,
and association) they characterise the correspondence between these hierarchies.
We employ the concept of hierarchical abstraction to distinguish the hierarchy of
business process models using the vertical abstraction defined by Weske [Wesk 12],
that describes the hierarchy of a business process model (see details in Section
4.2.1). Since it is decomposition of business process model, therefore, the relation
between the process hierarchical levels is aggregation. Aggregation means that the
levels are interrelated, where the lower level objects make it up to a higher level
component.
2.1.2 Modelling Perspectives
A modelling language has one or more core phenomena to express its goals, this
phenomena is referred as the modelling perspective(s) of a language [Krog 12].
Krogstie [Krog 12] has listed eight perspectives of conceptual modelling approaches
i.e., behavior, functional, structural, goal and rule, object, communication, actor
and role and topological perspectives (see the details in [Krog 12]). Similarly,
Curtis et al. [Curt 92] and Starke [Star 94] characterise four fundamental per-
spectives of business process modelling i.e., functional, behavioral, organisational
and informational. In this thesis we use graphical description of business process
models that is adopted from [Curt 92, Krog 12, Star 94]. It deals with the mod-
elling perspectives (i.e., functional, behavioral, organisational and informational)
of a business process model (see Section 4.2.2). These perspectives also serve
as a foundation and are frequently used as a classification for business process
modelling.
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2.2 Security Risk Management
The thesis pursues the domain of security risk management. The term security is
defined as “the degree to which malicious harm to a valuable asset is prevented,
reduced, and properly responded to” [Fire 04]. Firesmith distinguishes particu-
larly harm coming from intentional and unintentional source [Fire 07]. Therefore,
security is defined as the concerns related with lowering the risk of intentional
unauthorised harm to valuable assets to a level that is acceptable to the system’s
stakeholders by preventing and reacting to malicious harm, misuse, threats, and
security risks [Fire 07]. In contrast to security, safety is defined as concerned with
lowering the risk of unintentional unauthorised harm to valuable assets to a level
that is acceptable to the system’s stakeholders by preventing and reacting to such
harm, mishaps (i.e., accidents and incidents), hazards, and safety risks [Fire 07].
He then introduces the concept of defensibility that is comprised of both security
and safety. Within this thesis, security is only related to the harm coming from
intentional source.
2.2.1 Domain Model for Security Risk Management
In this thesis, a domain model (see Fig. 2.1) for Information Systems Security
Risk Management (ISSRM) [Dubo 10, Maye 09] is adopted to express the key
concepts of security risk management and their relationships. ISSRM di↵ers be-
cause along with the identification and specification of risks it also focuses on the
whole IS, instead of defining security requirements for one or more IS components.
Additionally a number of modelling languages (e.g., Secure Tropos [Matu 12a],
Mal-activities [Chow 12], Misuse cases [Soom 13] and recently BPMN [Altu 13])
could be applied following the ISSRM guidelines; thus providing a systematic
guidance for security risk management. ISSRM supports the definition of security
for the key IS constituents and addresses the IS security risk management pro-
cess at three di↵erent conceptual levels, i.e., asset-related, risk-related, and risk
treatment-related concepts as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Major concepts in ISSRM
Domain Model are briefly introduced here.
Assets-related concepts describe organisation’s assets and their security
criteria. Here, an asset is anything that is valuable and plays a vital role to ac-
complish organisation’s objectives. A business asset describes the information,
processes, capabilities and skills essential to the business and its core mission. An
IS asset is the IS component, valuable to the organisation since it supports business
assets. A security criterion is a property or constraint on business assets describ-
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Figure 2.1: ISSRM domain model, adapted from [Dubo 10, Maye 09]
ing their security needs, which are, typically, expressed through confidentiality,
integrity and availability.
Risk-related concepts introduce a risk definition. A risk is composed of a
threat with one or more vulnerabilities that leads to a negative impact on one
or more assets by harming them. An impact is the consequences of an event
that negates the security criterion defined for business assets in order to harm
assets. An event is an aggregation of threat and one or more vulnerabilities. A
vulnerability is the characteristics of IS assets that expose weakness or flaw. A
threat is an incident initiated by a threat agent using attack method to target one
or more IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities. A threat agent is an agent
who has means to harm IS assets intentionally. An attack method is a standard
means by which a threat agent executes threat.
Risk-treatment related concepts describe the concepts to treat risk. A risk
treatment is a decision (e.g., avoidance, reduction, retention, or transfer) to treat
the identified risk. A security requirement is the refinement of a risk treatment
decision to mitigate the risks. A control designates a means to improve the security
by implementing the security requirements.
The ISSRM application follows the general risk management process that is
also based on the existing security standards, e.g. [DCSS 04, ENIS 04, ISOI 05a].
It is an iterative process consisting of six steps. Firstly a developer needs to define
the organisational context and assets that need to be secured. Then, one deter-
mines security objectives (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) based on
the level of protection required for the identified assets. Next, risk analysis and
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assessment help identify potential risks and their impacts. Once risk assessment is
performed risk treatment decision should be taken. This decision would result in
security requirements definition. Finally, security requirements are implemented
into the security controls. The risk management process is iterative, because new
security controls might also open the possibility for new (not yet determined) se-
curity risks. In [Ahme 14b], we implicitly apply this security management process
to develop security risk-oriented patterns for securing business processes.
2.2.2 Security Criteria
Security is a multifaceted attribute of an information system and requires four
things to come together [Riaz 12]. A security objective defined as a high-level
security goal (such as confidentiality, integrity, availability) defining the contribu-
tions to a security that the system is intended to achieve [Fire 04]. Security policy,
a rule to define how far the assets of the system must be protected stating precisely
the protection strategy of a system [Fire 04]. A security control is a mechanism or
countermeasure (software elements, firmware, hard-ware, or procedures) included
in the system for the satisfaction of security requirements [Fire 04]. A security re-
quirement is functional and non-functional requirements relating security policies
to security controls [Riaz 12]. Security requirements formalize security objectives
without specifying their implementation. In this thesis, the security goal and se-
curity policy are expressed together as security criteria (desired protection level)
for an asset, while security control is not the scope of the thesis as we focus on
eliciting and specification of security requirements. The thesis specifies security
requirements at two di↵erent levels: first, in security risk-oriented patterns where
the security requirements are expressed at abstract level for its applicability in
di↵erent scenarios. Second, the detailed level security requirements in SREBP
method using several security models where the requirements are specific to the
asset’s context.
In the context of this thesis security criteria is expressed using CIA model
[Info 91] that addresses three key security criteria, i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability. In [Fire 04], there exists other security criteria (i.e., authoriza-
tion, non-repudiation and privacy) but they can be described in conjunction with
these three security criteria. Thus, we consider confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability as root security criteria that craft the foundation for security classification,
the other security criteria can be listed as low-level objectives [Aviz 04, Scan 08].
For example, authorization (labeled access control in [Fire 04]) is a compound se-
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curity criteria made up of confidentiality of data, integrity of data, and integrity
of application. The security criteria are defined as follows:
Confidentiality It deals with the protection of data from unauthorised disclo-
sure. A loss of confidentiality happens when the contents of a communication or
a file are disclosed as well as when the fact is made known that a communication
was carried out between certain parties.
Integrity It ensures the quality of data and system execution from impaired
act, i.e., free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorised manipulation. It means
that neither the data nor the system has been altered or destroyed.
Availability It refers to the fact that data and systems can be accessed by
authorised persons within an appropriate period of time. Reasons for loss of avail-
ability may be attacks (e.g. abusing known system vulnerabilities) or instabilities
of the system or its components.
2.2.3 Security Standards and Methods
This section gives an overview of existing risk management and security standards
and discusses security risk management methods.
Risk Management Standards The ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009 standard [ISOI 02]
provides the generic definitions for risk management concepts used in various activ-
ities, processes and frameworks related to the management of risk across di↵erent
organisation. The guide addresses risk management in general and is applicable to
information security. Similarly, The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 standard [ASNZ 09]
focuses on a generic risk management process for establishing the context, iden-
tifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and communicating risk. The
standard is supported by: ISO Guide 73:2009, it provides a glossary for risk man-
agement concepts; and IEC/ISO 31010:2009 [ISO 09], focuses on risk assessment
concepts, processes and the selection of risk assessment techniques. Similar to
ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009 [ISOI 02], the standard is generic and can be applied to
perform risk management in any domain.
Security Standards The ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 [ISOI 04] and Common
Criteria [Comm 12] are widely used security standards that particularly focusses
on the information security management but leaving behind the risk management
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activities. The ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 standard [ISOI 04] was initially published
as technical reports and later became an international standard. The standard
defines security concepts and models fundamental to a basic understanding of in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) security, and addresses the general
management issues that are essential to the successful planning, implementation
and operation of ICT security. The ISO/IEC 13335 series has been superseded and
replaced by ISO/IEC 2700x series to comply with the security risk management
standards. The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CC) standard [Comm 12] specifies a set of security requirements along with the
desired security objectives of a product or a system as security assurances. Next,
the evaluators determine if the selected security requirements satisfy the security
measures selected and implemented correctly. The Common Criteria (CC) defines
three major constructs: protection profile is an implementation-independent set
of security requirements to reduce the security risk; Security target contains the
desired security objectives and requirements identified for a particular system or
product, Target of Evaluation is a system or product that need to be evaluated.
Security Risk Management Standards The security risk management
standards deal with security particularly focusing risk management activities. The
most widely recognized security risk management standards are ISO/IEC 2700x
series [ISOI 13], NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Special
Publication (SP) 800 Series, and BSI standards 100 series for information technol-
ogy.
The ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard [ISOI 13] specifies the requirements nec-
essary to establish, implement, maintain and continuously improve and manage
an information security management system. The core concepts of information se-
curity risk management specified in ISO/IEC 27001 are supported by a standard
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [ISOI 11] that proposes an information security risk man-
agement process. The process performs context establishment, risk assessment,
risk treatment, risk acceptance, risk communication and consultation, and risk
monitoring and review. The process uses an iterative approach for risk assessment
and/or risk treatment activities. It uses the vocabulary of ISO/IEC 31000:2009
[ASNZ 09] and, therefore, it easily integrates the risk management approaches
with the information security risk management. Furthermore, the new standard
includes detailed guidelines with examples on conducting a risk assessment that
conforms to the requirements of ISO/IEC 27001:2013. Additionally, the standard
contains risk scales, threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods and impacts.
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The NIST published a comprehensive set of NIST standards addressing secu-
rity and risk in information system in their 800 series. In particular, the standard,
NIST SP 800-39 [NIST 11] describes a holistic risk management approach consist-
ing four components: 1 ) frame risk; 2 ) assess risk; 3 ) respond to risk; and 4 )
monitor risk. The risk assessment component published in the NIST SP 800-30
[NIST 12] provides a step-by-step process for organisations on assessing informa-
tion security risk and guides the communication between the risk assessments and
other organisational risk management processes. The process in NIST SP 800-30
consists of 4 steps: i) Prepare for risk assessments; ii) Conduct risk assessments;
iii) Communicate risk assessment results; and iv) Maintain the risk assessments.
The IT-Grundschutz – BSI series of standards is a set of German standards,
based on a security management method. The series contains four standards:
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) [BSI 08a], IT-Grundschutz
Methodology [BSI 08b], Risk analysis on the basis of IT-Grundschutz [BSI 08c]
and Business Continuity Management [BSI 09] and is complemented by the knowledge-
based materials referred as catalogues [IT G 13]. The catalogues contain lists of
assets, threats and safeguards, and are updated and regularly extended consider-
ing the latest technical developments. The first BSI standard, 100-1: Information
Security Management Systems (ISMS) [BSI 08a] specifies the general require-
ments for an Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). The standard
is compatible with ISO/IEC 27001:2005 [ISOI 05a] and, moreover considers the
recommendations of ISO/IEC 27002:2005 [ISOI 05b]. The second BSI standard,
100-2: IT-Grundschutz Methodology [BSI 08b] provides successive steps to assist
an e↵ective management system for information security. It includes details on,
how to develop an information security policy, how to select information secu-
rity safeguards and necessities for implementing the information security policy,
and how to maintain and improve information security during its operation. The
methodology relies on catalogues in implementing the requirements provided by
the ISO/IEC standards. The third BSI standard, 100-3: Risk analysis on the basis
of IT-Grundschutz [BSI 08c] outlines the risk analysis methodology to supplement
an existing IT-Grundschutz Methodology, to be used for additional security anal-
ysis. A supplementary security analysis should be performed on a particular set
of assets (or target objects) identified in the IT-Grundschutz Methodology. The
fourth BSI standard, 100-4: Business Continuity Management [BSI 09] builds on
the previous standards. The standard describes a systematic method, to detect
the risks that can endanger the survival (i.e., economic existence) of an organ-
isation, and to implement safeguards against such risks or even after incurring
the risks. The BSI standards comprehensively describe a process for achieving
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and maintaining an adequate level of security, and an approach to determine the
level of security. The IT-Grundschutz Catalogues [IT G 13] comprised of standard
security safeguards, threat scenarios usually, and detailed implementation of safe-
guards. These standards are freely available and are continuously subjected to
update reflecting the latest IT developments.
Security Risk Management Methods A risk management method is a
process that contains a set of activities executed systematically in a predefined
sequence. The risk management method may not always comply to a published
standard but comprised of activities that covers: the identification of threats, vul-
nerabilities, or risks and their impact on the organisations assets; risk assessment;
risk mitigation planning; implementation strategies; and evaluate their e↵ective-
ness. The section provides an overview of available security risk management meth-
ods such as EBIOS [DCSS 04], MEHARI [CLUS 10], OCTAVE method [Albe 03],
CRAMM Method [Koun 11] and CORAS approach [Lund 11].
The EBIOS method [EBIOS 14] is composed of five phases: the first phase
identifies the essential elements of an organisation and components of their infor-
mation system; The second and third phases determine the organisation’s security
needs and requirements, and the list of threats specific to their information sys-
tem; The fourth phase maps the organisation’s security needs to the identified
threats including proof of necessary security objective in mitigating the identi-
fied risks; Finally, the security requirements are selected to achieve the identified
security objectives. The method can be adapted to any particular context and
easily integrated to the existing methods without disrupting the primary flow of
the approach. The scope of EBIOS extends over the high-level analysis of an or-
ganisation’s information system to detailed level components of the information
systems (i.e., website, recruitment management, and etc.).
MEHARI [CLUS 10] process of risk assessment and management comply to the
requirements provided by standard IS0/IEC 27001:2005 [ISOI 05a] and adapted
the guidelines defines in standard ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [ISOI 08]. In MEHARI,
the risk assessment and management is performed in three steps: i) Stakes analysis
and classification analyses the business processes’ activities and their goals to de-
termine potential malfunctions and their seriousness (i.e., malfunction value scale).
Next, classify the identified assets of information system based on the required se-
curity goal (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability) and their malfunction value.
At last, an intrinsic impact table is build to evaluate the consequences of the risk
independent of any security measures. The output of this step is the malfunction
value scale and the classified asset with an intrinsic impact table. ii) Assessment of
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security services quality starts by developing criteria to assess the security service.
Next, the security services are compared with the state of the art of security by
means of MEHARI knowledge base. The evaluation results identify the potential
weaknesses in the security services; and iii) risk assessment starts by identify-
ing the risks and focusses the analysis to the critical situations, then, review the
seriousness of identified risks against the security service quality. The resulting
identified risks together with an assessment of likelihood and impact are used in
the next phase to define security requirements for their information system.
OCTAVE method [Albe 03] is a self-directed risk-based strategic assessment
and planning approach that comprised of three phases. Firstly, build asset-based
threat profiles from a di↵erent level of organisation, i.e., senior management, op-
erational area and sta↵ by conducting workshops. Secondly, the key components
of the information system supporting critical assets are evaluated to identify the
technological vulnerabilities. Finally, the risks are evaluated, and the risk profiles
are developed to define appropriate security strategy and risk mitigation plans.
OCTAVE method has two variants, OCTAVE-S [Albe 05] and OCTAVE Allegro
[Cara 07]. The OCTAVE-S approach [Albe 05] is adopted for a small organisa-
tion, which rely on individuals knowledge of security and information systems
rather than formal knowledge elicitation workshops. OCTAVE Allegro [Cara 07],
a variant of standard OCTAVE that proposes a systematic process mainly fo-
cused on information assets (i.e., their usage, storage, transport, and processing,
and their threats, vulnerabilities, and disruptions). However, each variant of OC-
TAVE method has its advantages. Users can select any of them that satisfy their
security risk assessment needs.
The CRAMM (CCTA1 Risk Analysis and Management Method) [Koun 11] en-
sures that security requirements are fully analysed and documented, avoid unneces-
sary safeguards and inconsistencies in risk assessments, and involve management
in planning and implementing security throughout the various stages of system
lifecycle. The CRAMM method is performed in three steps [Koun 11, Maye 09].
Firstly, identify the assets, their values are calculated. The physical assets’ values
are derived from their replacement cost. Data and software assets’ values are de-
rived from the impact of breaches of any of the security objectives, i.e., unavailable,
destroyed, disclosed, or modified. Secondly, threat and vulnerability assessed us-
ing predefined mappings between threats and assets as well as between threats and
impacts. This results in a risk matrix for each asset group. Finally, on the basis of
risk analysis a set of countermeasures are selected from a large set of countermea-
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sures that are hierarchically organised in logical groups and sub-groups. The set of
countermeasures contains necessary information from high-level security objectives
to the technical implementation illustrated using examples required to manage the
identified risks.
CORAS is a model-driven approach to risk analysis and adopted the core
generic risk management process defined in AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 standard
[Lund 11]. CORAS consists of three tightly integrated artefacts: a language, a
tool and a method. The CORAS language is a customised language that pro-
vides graphical symbols and its relations for risk modelling. These symbols are
easy to use and to communicate with the stakeholders from di↵erent backgrounds
(e.g., software development, security or business). The CORAS tool supports the
language and is a graphical editor for making any CORAS diagram. Further-
more, the tool facilitates to document and present a risk analysis results. The
CORAS method has adapted risk management process from ISO 31000:2009 stan-
dard [ASNZ 09] and provides detailed guidelines and techniques to facilitate var-
ious steps of CORAS risk analysis. The risk management process starts by iden-
tifying the stakeholders and vulnerabilities, and establishing the context, which
system’s parts, process or organisation will be analysed. Next, the risk assessment
includes activities to identify risks, estimate risks and evaluate risks. Then, miti-
gation strategies are defined to treat the identified risks that involve a structured
brainstorming, and are supported by CORAS treatment diagrams. Finally, con-
nect the risk analysis process to the rest of the business, system or organisation
and continuously monitor and review the risk management process.
2.3 Model Driven Security
This section gives an overview of security modelling languages used to elicit se-
curity requirements in early stages of information system development. Further-
more, the study discusses their extensions to adopt security risk concepts from
risk management domain. In the end, the section provides details about security
risk modelling in business processes.
2.3.1 Security Modelling Languages
Misuse Cases [Sind 05] are a security-oriented extension of the UML use cases
[Business 14]. Misuse cases have graphical and textual representation like use
cases. Misuse case diagrams are extended with misuser, misuse case, and security
use cases constructs including threatens and mitigates relationships (see Fig. 2.2).
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A misuser intends to harm the software system. A misuse case is a goal of misuser,
the association is represented by a communication association. Misuser executes
misuse case either by combine e↵orts of several misuse cases or independently.
Threatens and mitigates relationships are used between use cases and misuse cases.
Threatens relationship means a misuse case is potentially a threat to harm the use
case. Mitigates relationship indicates that a use case is countermeasure against
any misuse case. Security-use-case is a special use case to perform countermeasure
against the identified threat. As illustrated in Fig. 2.2 misuse cases are integrated
in use case diagrams to express the system unwanted behaviour (e.g., misuse cases
Money stolen, Enter pin code result repeatedly, and Transfer money to
own account) initiated by a misuser (e.g., Attacker). This depiction results in
security use cases e.g., Perform cryptographic procedures.
Figure 2.2: An example of misuse case diagram, adapted from [Ahme 12b]
Soomro and Ahmed [Soom 13] proposed security risk-oriented misuse cases
(SROMUC) to strengthens the misuse case diagrams. The idea is to comply misuse
cases with security risk management strategies because they lack several concrete
constructs to represent secure assets, security-risks and their countermeasures.
These limitations could lead to misinterpretation of the security-related concepts
and results in inadequate security solutions. The work extends the syntax and
semantics of misuse case diagrams [Sind 05]. The proposed graphical extensions
are not intuitive, and they are related to the security concerns supported by the
ISSRM domain model. However, the proposal keeps the SROMUC comprehensible
and comply with the original definition of (mis)use cases. The SROMUC di↵eren-
tiates the constructs for impact and security criterion from the standard UML use
case constructs. The security use case construct has been enhanced to di↵erentiate
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security requirements from the functional requirements, but the SROMUC does
not address the risk treatment and control implementation.
Secure Tropos [Mour 03, Mour 07, Mour 06] enriches Tropos (an agent-oriented
software development methodology) [Bres 04, Cast 02] by introducing security re-
lated constructs such as security constraint and threat. In Tropos and Secure
Tropos the concepts of actor, (hard or soft) goal, plan and resource constructs are
common. In addition, Secure Tropos defines the concepts of security constraint
and threat. A security constraint is a security restriction that the system must
satisfy. A threat represents circumstances, which lead to an event that endangers
the security features of the system. Additionally, the notion of vulnerability point
(any system’s weakness) is introduced by Elahi and Yu in [Elah 07]. Constructs
in Secure Tropos are connected using relationships: dependency (and its subtype
of secure dependency), decomposition, means-ends, contribution, restricts and at-
tacks. Matulevičius et al. [Matu 12b] extend Secure Tropos, called as Risk-aware
Secure Tropos, to support the modelling of security risks and their countermea-
sures. The study proposes syntactic, semantic and methodological extensions to
the Secure Tropos. The extensions mainly expressed in three conceptual groups,
i.e., asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk-treatment related con-
cepts. The study main idea is to align Secure Tropos with the domain model of
security risk management [Dubo 10, Maye 09]. The study also defined the method-
ological guidelines for applying the risk-aware Secure Tropos during early stages
of information system development.
Mal(icious)-Activity Diagrams [Sind 07] is an extension of standard UML
activity diagrams with the purpose to capture security in activity diagrams. In
mal-activity diagrams the concepts of malicious activity, malicious actor and mali-
cious decision are introduced. The malicious activity is an activity that can harm
the system, represented as normal activity, but with inverted colour. A malicious
activity is initiated by a malicious actor whose goal is to harm the system and
represented by normal swimlanes with inverted colour. The malicious decision
represents where malicious user makes the decision to perform a malicious ac-
tivity; malicious decision is represented as ordinary decision box using inverted
colour. The idea is similar to misuse cases where misuse cases provide an abstract
overview of the required functions while missing the sequence of activities, which
make it di cult to map the malicious activity with the system execution. In this
case, mal-activity diagrams complements the security analysis by representing the
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sequence of activities (i.e., detailed system design) in activity diagrams. It helps
to change the execution of activities in order to address the mal-activity.
SecureUML is a UML-based modelling language proposed by Lodderstedt et
al. [Lodd 02]. It supports the development of secured distributed systems by
integrating the information relevant to their access control into the application
models. SecureUML focuses on embedding role-based access control policies in
UML class diagrams using a UML profile (i.e., annotating class diagrams with
relevant access control information). The main RBAC concepts expressed using
SecureUML are users, roles, objects, operations and permissions.
A user is a human being or a software agent, and role is a job function within
the context of an organisation modelled using ⌧role  stereotype. Permissions
characterise role privileges to perform operations on the protected object. An ob-
ject is a protected resource. An operation is an executable set of actions that can
change the state of the protected resource by creating or manipulating its proper-
ties. Permissions specify the security actions –namely, Create, Read and Update–
that the role can perform over the state of the protected resource. SecureUML for-
mally expresses role-based access control policies for objects but does not consider
an attacker model; similarly, the approach covers the security goals of confidential-
ity and integrity, but not availability [Fabi 10]. In this thesis, SecureUML is used
in SREBP method to define security requirements for accessing and manipulating
protected business assets in the business processes, which required satisfying the
security criteria of confidentiality and integrity.
Attack tree [Schn 99] is a formal way of expressing a set of varying attacks
against an information system. Attack tree connects more than one attack leaf
from each node in a tree structure. The root node is the overall goal of the attack
and nodes (i.e., leaf nodes) at all levels below the root represent di↵erent ways of
achieving the overall goal of an attack. The idea is to understand the di↵erent
ways in which the system can be attacked and identify the attackers to install the
proper countermeasures to deal with the real threats. The leaf nodes are connected
to the top node with logic operators AND or OR. Therefore, either a single node
can fulfil the goal of the level above it or a combination of one or more sub-goals
are required to achieve the goal of the level above. For instance, with an OR
operator, the attack tree needs one of the leafs to satisfy the goal, whereas in case
of AND operator all the leafs of the tree must be satisfied to meet the top-level
goal. An example of an attack tree is illustrated in Fig 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: An example of attack tree, adapted from [Schn 99]
In this example, the leaves Listen Conversation and Get Target to State
Combination having an AND logical operator. Therefore, both are required to exe-
cute successfully in order to achieve the goal of the level above it, i.e., (Eavesdrop).
It is important to note that the rest of the attack leaves are connected in the attack
tree using OR logical operator. Hence, if any of the attack leaves from the rest of
the attack tree are satisfied, it is su cient to satisfy the overall goal of the attack
tree (i.e., Open Safe). In this thesis, attack trees are used to model attack meth-
ods during the security analysis performed by SQUARE method, when SREBP
method is validated in a Genome Centre case study.
2.3.2 Security-Risk Modelling in Business Processes
Due to the nature of inherent risks in the routine operations and interactions
with stakeholders, the enterprises are always vulnerable to potential security risks.
Identifying and understanding the relationships between these risks and security
solutions are essential to mitigate these risks e↵ectively. However, business pro-
cess modelling languages lack a systematic security risk management approach to
address the security risk-related concepts. Eventually, in business processes mod-
elling, security ends up as an afterthought because it is not well integrated with reg-
ular engineering processes. In [Altu 12], the business process modelling language,
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Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN, version 2.0) [Dijk 08, Silv 09], is
analysed at the fine-grained level to outline its capabilities to deal with security.
BPMN notations are linked to a semantic model, which means that each shape
has a particular meaning and defined rules to connect objects. Altuhhova et al.
[Altu 13] mainly investigate: i) how business activities expressed using BPMN
could be annotated with the security concerns; ii) how BPMN could be used
to define security requirements; and iii) how the BPMN language itself could
be used to reason for the security requirements through illustration of the po-
tential security risks. In this analysis, the concepts of the ISSRM domain model
[Dubo 10, Maye 09] are aligned with the BPMN constructs. This alignment results
in proposing a set of security risk-oriented extensions for BPMN. The extensions
enable BPMN application to analyse security risks by providing guidelines to ex-
press secure business assets, potential security risks, and their countermeasures.
This section briefly describes the analysis (i.e., lacking) [Altu 12] and the pro-
posed set of security risk-oriented extensions (i.e., constructs) [Altu 13] to make
the business process modelling language, risk-aware. Additionally, di↵erent colours
are used to improve the expressibility of security risk analysis across the three con-
cept groups, i.e., i) black for the asset related constructs, ii) red for the risk-related
constructs, and iii) blue for the risk treatment-related constructs.
Asset-related concepts. In the first place, Altuhhova et al. [Altu 12] ob-
serve that its constructs, such as task, gateway, event and their connecting link,
i.e., sequence flow, help describing valuable processes that correspond to ISSRM
business assets. The flow objects (such as task, gateway and event) are contained
in the BPMN containers; i.e., pools and lanes. In other words, the container
constructs support definition and execution of the business processes. In terms
of ISSRM, the pool and lane constructs are aligned to the ISSRM information
system assets. The BPMN data object, which describes the required or produced
data, is aligned to the ISSRM business asset, and BPMN data store is defined as
the ISSRM IS asset. Here, Altuhhova et al [Altu 12] indicated the importance to
di↵erentiate between meanings of the BPMN constructs when expressing di↵erent
ISSRM concepts. For example, the BPMN task could be used to express both the
ISSRM business assets and IS assets. In order to distinguish this two icons are
introduced as illustrated in [Altu 13]. Additionally, a visual element – lock – is
used to express the ISSRM security objective. The lock is placed (as the constraint
of) on the business asset, representing its security needs. The security criterion is
defined, then, in the annotation associated to the lock construct.
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Risk-related concepts. The BPMN language does not contain the direct
means to model security risks [Altu 12]. Therefore, the concrete syntax to express
risk-related concepts are introduced in [Altu 13], where, the ISSRM threat agent
could be expressed using the BPMN containers, i.e., pools and lanes, and the
ISSRM attack method is defined as the combination of flow objects (i.e., event,
gateway, and task) using sequence flows. The ISSRM vulnerability could be defined
using annotations, which are assigned to the vulnerability point. This point is
defined as the characteristic of the IS asset. Further, the notion of the ISSRM
impact is introduced using unlock symbol. If the security criterion is negated
then the security objective (defined using lock) is broken. The appropriate BPMN
relationships (leads to relationships) are used to define how risk harms the business
asset(s) and IS asset(s). Following the domain model, the ISSRM threat is defined
as a combination of the BPMN constructs used to model threat agent and attack
method; the ISSRM event is expressed through the combination of constructs for
threat and vulnerability. The ISSRM risk is modelled using the BPMN constructs
for event and impact.
Risk treatment-related concepts. The combination of flow objects (i.e.,
event, gateway, and task) is used to model the ISSRM security requirements and
mitigation relationship [Altu 13]. Other ISSRM constructs are not explicitly ex-
pressed because i) the risk treatment is rather a decision done towards the miti-
gation of the identified risk, and ii) security control is a part of the system imple-
mentation stage (but not analysis, where BPMN is typically applied).
2.4 Conclusion
We conclude that an enterprise’s business processes are key artefacts to address
the security. They drive their information system to achieve the business goals,
thus, addressing security in business processes allows early security analysis at the
development of information systems. In this chapter, firstly, we give an overview
of business processes, their implementation in business process model and how
business process model enables the constituents of business process (i.e., perspec-
tives) to model at di↵erent abstractions level. Secondly, we provide an overview of
security risk management concepts and discuss the domain model for information
system security risk management. The model gives foundation for security risk
related work in this thesis. The chapter touches upon existing security risk man-
agement standards and methods used in the industry. Finally, we discuss several
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model-driven security techniques used in security analysis to support the early
security requirements elicitation in information system development.
In the next chapter, ISSRM domain model is used to develop security risk-
oriented patterns. Chapter 4 integrates the characteristics of business process
models (i.e., abstraction level and perspectives) with the security criteria in a
three-dimensional taxonomy. On the basis of security patterns and ISSRM domain
model, Chapter 5 proposes a systematic method for requirements elicitation and









In this contribution [Ahme 14b], we introduce security risk-oriented patterns that
describe how to integrate the security requirements into business process models.
Typically, security engineering requires a close collaboration between the business
analyst (i.e., the specialist of the business domain) and security analyst (i.e., the
specialist of the security domain). Being experts in business domain, business an-
alysts have limited or no expertise in security engineering. They have to rely on
the best security practices, information security standards, or security experts. To
improve this situation, we propose to use security risk-oriented patterns. The idea
is that the majority of the problems often do not require new solutions. Devel-
opers reuse similar solutions already implemented independently or elicit di↵erent
aspects of similar problems; they have already solved in another situation. By
introducing the security risk-oriented patterns, we potentially reduce the business
analysts’ need to ask for the help from the security analysts because patterns
introduce both the security requirements and security rationale.
3.1 Security Patterns
Pattern-oriented software engineering has spread after the release of Gang-of-Four
[Gamm 95]. Developers are using this approach to solve system development prob-
lems in a well-structured way. The success behind the patterns-oriented engineer-
ing is that patterns provide a basis for the development using a collective knowledge
from the relevant domain.
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According to Schumacher et al. [Schu 05] “a security pattern describes a par-
ticular recurring security problem that arises in a specific security context and
presents a well-proven generic scheme for a security solution”. Following this def-
inition, we develop a set of security risk-oriented patterns (i.e., generic scheme).
The patterns are based on understanding security risks (i.e., recurring security
problems) that arise within business processes (i.e., specific security context). To
mitigate the risks, the patterns recommend security requirements (i.e., security
solution).
3.2 Research Method
The primary research objective is to develop security patterns for business pro-
cesses (see details in Section 3.3.2) and illustrate their usage in business process
models. We follow a 4-step research method, depicted in Figure 3.1. Firstly, a
template for security risk pattern is developed in Step 1. The template (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1) uses security risk concepts defined in ISSRM domain model [Dubo 10,
Maye 09]. Secondly, we collect security-related information that includes system’s
vulnerabilities, risk and their attack methods from the literature and align it with
the context of information system in Step 2. The collected information is struc-
tured into security patterns (see Section 3.3.2 & 3.3.3). Thirdly, security concepts
from security patterns are expressed into business process modelling language us-
ing ISSRM-oriented modelling languages in Step 3. Security risk-aware extensions
are published in [Altu 13] and briefly discussed in Section 2.3.2. Finally, in Step
4, we investigate the usefulness of these security patterns by applying them in two
business cases.
3.3 Security Risk-oriented Patterns
The security risk-oriented patterns are developed using a structured specification,
i.e., a security risk-oriented template, and graphically represented using risk-aware
business process modelling language that business analysts can understand easily.
3.3.1 Security risk-oriented template
Initially, the security patterns [Fern 01] were developed using traditional software
patterns e.g., Gang-of-Four [Gamm 95]. Therefore, the structure of these patterns
were inspired or based on a design or architectural concerns. Such patterns are
good enough to implement security at the design stage of information system.
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Figure 3.1: Research method for developing the security risk-oriented pat-
terns
However, the main problem is their ability to capture security requirements from
business processes. To overcome this limitation, we develop a security risk-based
template [Ahme 11] that particularly focusses on the business process domain.
A security risk-based template follows the domain model for information sys-
tems security risk management (ISSRM) [Dubo 10, Maye 09]. The ISSRM do-
main model describes the security risk management in information system using
three di↵erent concept groups, i.e., asset-related, risk-related, and risk treatment-
related concepts. A security risk-based template (see Table 3.1) consists of three
major entries, namely pattern name, pattern description, and related pattern(s),
and three entries that support definitions of the ISSRM concepts. These entries
include (i) assets-related concepts describe the security context by defining organ-
isation’s assets and their security criteria; (ii) risk-related concepts describe the
security problem by defining a risk, its impact and the attack method to exploit
vulnerabilities and execute threat; and (iii) risk-treatment related concepts de-
scribe security solutions to solve the identified security problems by defining one
or more countermeasures applied to treat the risks.
In order to apply security risk concepts (expressed in security risk-oriented pat-
terns) in business process modelling, we analyse a language for business process
modelling with respect to ISSRM domain model [Dubo 10, Maye 09]. The anal-
ysis helps to understand the key aspects of business process modelling language
in expressing secure assets, risks and risk treatment. It aligns the constructs in
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Table 3.1: Security Risk-oriented Template
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification
Pattern name It represents the pattern, and captures its security context. Usually, this
attribute is used to remember and refer the pattern. Ideally, it should
contain the name of the problem been addressed in the pattern.
Pattern description It describes the scenario in which the pattern may apply. This attribute
includes the detailed information about the business context; what are the
input(s) and output(s), and under which circumstances it will be executed
or processed.
Related pattern(s) It is an optional attribute to save information about the other patterns
related to current security pattern.
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination
Asset An asset is any valuable thing that plays a vital role to accomplish or-
ganisation’s objectives.
Business Asset A business asset describes the information, processes, capabilities and
skills essential to the business and its core mission.
IS Asset An IS asset is the IS component, valuable to the organisation since it
supports business assets.
Security criteria A security criterion is a property or constraint on business assets describ-
ing their security needs which are typically expressed through confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability of business assets.
3. Risk analysis & assessment
Risk A risk is composed of one or more events and their negative impacts on
one or more assets by harming them.
Impact An impact is the potential consequences of a risk that may harm assets
of the system when a threat (or the risk event) is accomplished.
Event An event is an aggregation of threat and one or more vulnerabilities.
Threat A threat is an incident initiated by a threat agent using attack method
to target one or more IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability A vulnerability is the characteristics of IS assets that exposes weakness
or flaw.
Threat agent A threat agent is an agent who has means to harm IS assets intentionally.
Attack method An attack method is a standard means by which a threat agent executes
threat.
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements
Risk treatment A decision (e.g., avoidance, reduction, retention, or transfer) to treat the
identified risk.
Security requirement Security requirement is the refinement of the risk treatment decision to
mitigate the potential risks.
Security Control A control that designates a means to improve the security by implement-
ing the security requirements.
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business process modelling language with the concepts of security domain and
highlights the shortcoming of business modelling language in expressing security
risk-related concepts. Furthermore, alignment provides foundation to introduce
a set of security risk-oriented extensions for business process modelling language.
These extensions make the modelling language security risk-aware, which could be
used to express secure business assets, potential security risks, and their counter-
measures identified in security risk-oriented patterns.
3.3.2 Security Risk-oriented Patterns Development
Once the structure (i.e., template) of security patterns is defined, security risk-
oriented patterns are developed on the basis of three conceptual areas adopted from
ISSRM domain model, i.e., asset, risk and risk treatment, -related concepts. The
process of pattern development implicitly uses security risk management process
described in ISSRM domain model (see Section 2.2.1). The process of pattern
development comprises of the following five activities.
In asset-related concepts, the process starts with an (i) identification of in-
formation system’s context, focusing on the asset identification. Initially, we have
identified ten contexts (reported in [Ahme 12a]) for security patterns, which is then
reduced to five contexts on the basis of six functions (proposed in [Alte 06], i.e.,
capture, transmit, store, retrieve, manipulate and display information) that infor-
mation technology can perform to process information in an information system.
Based on these categories, we currently develop five security risk-oriented patterns
(see Section 3.3.3). First pattern secures data transmission, second ensures valid
data entry into system, third makes the data available, fourth provides authorised
data access and its manipulation, and last pattern secures stored data. Next, we
(ii) identify assets & determine security criteria within each context. The security
criteria are determined using CIA model (described in Section 2.2.2). The final
output of this activity is a business process model that illustrates the identified
asset and its security criteria with the help of security risk-oriented extensions
proposed in [Altu 13] (see Section 2.3.2).
In risk-related concepts, we perform (iii) analyse security risks to identify
security risks characterised by threats, vulnerabilities and risk impact (see ISSRM
domain model in Section 2.2.1). The activity starts by identifying security flaws
(listed in [Tsip 05]), followed by the risk analysis, and finally countermeasures are
proposed to mitigate risks. These security expertises are collected from a variety of
sources including relevant security literature (for each pattern details are provided
in [Ahme 14b]). The risk-related concepts are documented in the template. These
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concepts are represented in security risk-oriented model using security risk-oriented
extensions for BPMN [Altu 13] (see Section 2.3.2).
Finally, in risk treatment-related concepts, first, we specify the (iv) risk treat-
ment decision (see Section 2.2.1), and then (v) identify security requirements to
mitigate the identified risks. These security requirements are presented in busi-
ness process model using security risk-oriented extensions [Altu 13] described in
Section 2.3.2. In the pattern template, we briefly suggest security control(s) to
implement the security requirement(s). Currently, the scope of these patterns is to
elicit security requirements for securing enterprise’s business assets and identifies
risks associated to these assets, and illustrate the rationale for these risks. There-
fore, we briefly suggest security controls without going into their implementation
details. However, in Chapter 5, we present an approach [Matu 13, Ahme 15] to
develop security models that refine these security requirements in detail.
3.3.3 Overview of Security Risk-oriented Patterns
In [Ahme 14b], we described five security risk-oriented patterns to facilitate busi-
ness analysts. These patterns follow a security risk template and define three
major security concepts: i) assets-related concepts ; ii) risk-related concepts ; and
iii) risk-treatment related concepts. The security patterns are expressed using the
security risk-aware BPMN as described earlier and illustrate security requirements
to protect the identified assets. The patterns are published in [Ahme 14b]. Here,
we give an overview by highlighting the business assets (that need to be secured)
and their security criteria. Each pattern contributes to the achievement of one
or more security criteria, i.e., confidentiality and integrity of data, integrity and
availability of business activity. A single pattern may have multiple criteria asso-
ciated with it. Thus, one security requirement could potentially contribute to the
accomplishment of more than one security criteria.
SRP 1 Pattern secures the data transmitted between the business entities.
This pattern addresses the electronic transmission of data between two entities
i.e., client and business. In Fig. 3.2(a), SRP1 indicates that a client submits
data to the business that is then employed by business. In this pattern data
corresponds to business assets and avoids the risk of unauthorised interception of
data during transmission because the unencrypted data could be misused (i.e., read
and kept for a later use or modified and passed to the server). The threat negates
the confidentiality and integrity of data. The pattern introduces the security
requirements of making data unreadable and verify the received data.
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Figure 3.2: Asset-related concepts of security patterns adapted from
[Ahme 14b]
SRP 2 Pattern ensures valid data entry into business processes by rejecting the
unwanted malicious data.
This pattern (see Fig. 3.2(b)) secures the business activity employ (i.e., any activ-
ity after data is submitted), which integrity and availability have to be ensured.
An attacker can exploit the activity submit to send malicious scripts. Executing
these scripts risks the confidentiality and integrity of data itself, any activity af-
ter data is submitted may be harmed, become unavailable or loose its integrity;
additionally the input interface would be compromised. To mitigate the risk(s),
pattern introduces security requirement to validate the incoming data.
SRP 3 Pattern ensures the availability of services or business assets by protecting
the IS from denial of service (DoS) attack.
This pattern addresses the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and their protection
strategies. The major idea is to protect the business services (i.e., business assets)
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provided by a business, in order to guarantee the security criteria, i.e., availability
of this business service. In Fig. 3.2(c), the SRP3 illustrates that a client requests
the service provided by a business. In this situation, an attacker can target the
server by exploiting the protocols (e.g., TCP, ICMP, or DNS) used at server.
Thus, the server becomes incapable to operate the business service and becomes
unavailable to their users. The threat provokes the loss of the business consumers’
confidence in the service provider.To reduce such attack(s), pattern proposes a
security requirement for checking for incoming requests.
SRP 4 Pattern secures the confidential data by applying multi-level security.
This pattern describes how to secure confidential data from access by the unau-
thorised people or devices. The pattern is based on the implementation of access
control where (stakeholder or device) roles and data are classified to levels of trust
and sensitivity. In Fig. 3.2(d), SRP4 exhibits a client requests data (a confiden-
tial business asset). In response to this request, the data are retrieved (using the
retrieval interface characterised as the IS asset) and provided to the client. The
problem arises if the retrieval of the confidential data is allowed to any user (in-
dependently whether s/he is malicious or not) without checking his or her access
permissions to the data. To reduce such risk, the check for the access rights should
be implemented. The requirement means one needs to authenticate an individual’s
access rights to create, access or manipulate a business asset.
SRP 5 Pattern ensures the data privacy at the data store against insiders (i.e.,
administrators or malware that infects data store).
The goal of this pattern is to prevent the leaking of confidential data from the
enterprise’s data store. In Fig. 3.2(e), there exists a storing/retrieval interface
(i.e., IS asset), which helps business (i) to store the data (i.e., business asset)
in the data store and (ii) to retrieve them when needed. If the storing/retrieval
interface (also including the queries to the database) are designed in a way that
data are saved/retrieved in a plain format. Therefore, unauthorised individuals
can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data. To reduce such security
risk, one needs to introduce security requirements making data invisible and visible
and log the data store activities when the data are stored and retrieved in the data
store.
Security risk-oriented patterns present security requirements and rationale for
security countermeasure, suggesting business analyst, the solutions on how to
achieve the required security objectives. The security risks are visualised using
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a security risk-aware extensions [Altu 13] to business process modelling language.
The visualisation justifies security solution and helps the business analyst to deter-
mine what constitutes the overall risk level in terms of security event potentiality
and impact level. However, the precise estimation depends on the analysed prob-
lem domain. Taking into account these measures, the business analyst can judge
what security requirements should be implemented into the security control. The
idea behind these security patterns is to present a holistic approach that closes
the gap between security risk management and business process models. These
security patterns show the application of the proposed approach. However, we
acknowledge that the current set of security patterns is not complete and there is
a need to develop more security patterns to secure business processes from variety
of risks. The usage of these patterns is illustrated on the business models of two
business cases i) land management organisation and ii) construction organisation.
Their complex execution of activities, significant IT dependency, and continuous
data exchange between various stakeholders (for details see [Ahme 14b]) are the
reasons to select these business cases. Two authors of [Ahme 14b] have performed
the experiment and the results are discussed in [Ahme 14b]. However, due to un-
availability of stakeholders, results could not be validated from the process owners.
3.4 Related Work
The use of security patterns in addressing security is not novel. A detailed sur-
vey [Yosh 08] described the adoption of security patterns during di↵erent stages
(i.e. requirement, design and implementation) of information system development.
The study discussed the application and methodology of security patterns to make
the system secure. The study emphasises on security pattern application starting
from the requirements engineering to design and implementation. Particularly at
requirements stage, patterns are classified to analysis process patterns and model-
based patterns. The analysis process patterns comprised of several patterns for
asset valuation, threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk determination
and enterprise security patterns adopted from [Schu 05]. Moreover, model-based
patterns use models for analysis and specification of security requirements. Sim-
ilarly, the proposed security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 14b] comply to the re-
quirements stage as the details included in three concept groups correspond to the
analysis process patterns. Also, their representations using risk-ware business pro-
cess modelling language come under model-based patterns. However, the proposed
patterns are focused on business processes models.
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Another study [Vare 13] proposed an automated selection of countermeasures
by adding the organisational metrics and constraints in security patterns. The
security patterns are integrated with a model linking security goals, descriptions
of problems (i.e., vulnerability database), and solutions (risk treatment). The
study uses security patterns to specify the security countermeasures in business
processes formally. Therefore, the patterns include information to evaluate how
much pattern is suitable among others. In contrast, security risk-oriented patterns
address the problem of security requirements elicitation and their specification. In
addition to requirements, patterns include information to specify the rationale for
these requirements.
Röhrig and Knorr [Rohr 04] presented a method to derive security require-
ments by assigning the security level to business process components (i.e., artefacts,
activities and actors) using a formal descriptive language. They define security
levels into several categories. These categories include confidentiality, integrity,
availability and accountability. These security levels are assigned to artefacts and
activities while actors are assigned to the corresponding clearance levels to satisfy
the respective security level. Consistency checks ensure that there are no conflicts
between the modelled security levels and that actors have appropriate clearances to
perform the tasks they were assigned to. Next, the appropriate security measures
are automatically derived from a configurable rule-base regarded as a predefined
matrix that maps security objectives to the security control. The method pro-
duces a catalogue of security measures for each participant, activity, and artefact
of business process. These security assignments depend on the predefined rule-
base. The approach is supported by software tool that facilitates business analysts
in implementing security. However, the approach produces a catalogue separately,
and therefore security can only be applied when the processes are defined in ad-
vance. The approach does not provide any details how they performed security
risk analysis for corresponding security requirements. Therefore, the rationale for
requirements is missing and also in the future the approach cannot perform risk
assessments and requirements prioritization. On the other hand, the proposed
security risk-oriented patterns provide rationale for security requirements and also
in the future there is a possibility to complement these patterns with valuation
of assets, likelihood analysis of potential vulnerabilities and their impact analysis.
Such analysis would help in assessing the value for the likelihood and the possible
consequences of identified risks.
In [Rena 09], the method is presented to derive requirements using patterns.
Likewise, in security risk-oriented patterns, their method determines the collabora-
tion of customers and technical consultants. Their method can be used for eliciting
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security requirements but lacks the emphasis on risk management. A collection
of security patterns proposed in [Schu 05] addresses several levels of abstraction,
which perform risk assessment and mitigation. However, their applicability in
business processes requires mapping to business process constructs.
In comparison to pattern-based approaches, other studies integrate risk man-
agement with business processes. Muehlen and Rosemann [Mueh 05] identify risk
as an inherent part of every business activity. They have developed the techniques
for risk-aware process modelling and presented a graphical extension of Event-
driven Process Chains (EPC) to express risks. Similarly, Cope et al. [Cope 10] in-
troduced risk-extended process models using BPMN. Their approach supports risk
assessment, specification of vulnerabilities and countermeasures, but it lacks the
specification of security requirements. Varela-Vaca et al. [Vare 11] have also ex-
tended the BPMN meta-model to add the risk-based concerns. They have adapted
the concept of UML profile to model threat scenarios in separate pools attached
to the business processes, which is too technical for business analysts.
An asset-driven risk assessment approach [Khan 10] addresses the problems to
track of dependencies between organisation’s assets and their realistic values. The
approach focuses on business goals that involves the identification and evaluation
of risk on a business process level, then find the aggregation based on their crit-
icality, role and importance. They extended existing risk assessment approaches
by introducing the risk evaluation using business processes. In contrast to existing
approaches, the focus is on the business processes value rather than the assets.
The reason is that the core business processes of an enterprise and their results
are directly linked to enterprise revenue and therefore more valuable than the as-
sets used or involved in accomplishing this process. Assets are part of the process.
Therefore, they are indirectly assessed. The approach is applied in two phases:
risk assessment and risk treatment. Authors highlighted the problems by keeping
a track of asset dependencies, which help in estimating the asset values. How-
ever, in-depth risk analysis is missing and provides no mechanism for eliciting and
representing security requirements in business process models. Similarly, an IT
risk reference model [Sack 08] is proposed to highlight the causes of IT risks and
their e↵ects on business processes. Risk management methods are extended with
the process-oriented view to align both economic and technological perspectives
of business. The model consists of four layers: business Processes, IT applica-
tions/IT infrastructure, vulnerabilities and threats. This reference model serves
as a foundation for formal modelling of the relation between causes of IT risk and
their e↵ect on business processes. The model is described in an abstract way and is
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not related to security requirements elicitation, further it lacks a detailed security
risk analysis.
3.5 Limitations and Future Work
In this contribution [Ahme 14b], we have used security patterns to bridge the gap
between the security engineering and business process domains. The proposal has
several limitations. Here, we mention these limitations and outline further re-
search as future work to strengthens the proposed security patterns. Currently, in
asset-related concepts, the security patterns are limited only to the identification
and annotation of business assets and their security criteria in business models.
Therefore, security patterns required a scale or criteria to perform asset valuation.
Similarly, the security patterns lack risk assessments. Thus, the risk-related con-
cepts should be complemented with risk assessments using in-depth assessment of
identified threats and vulnerabilities including their impact analysis. Risk treat-
ment concepts should also include the cost measurement to support the security
trade-o↵ analysis. Finally, the security patterns are maintained manually; a tool
support can make the patterns’ data, easy to maintain. Also, interconnect the
security concepts of a single pattern across several patterns, which opens the pos-






Security architects are encouraged to use the proven solutions for security prob-
lems using security patterns. Documenting and publishing security patterns has
become an area of intense focus in recent years. We take a deeper look into the
various taxonomies in which the business process models and security have been
classified. We find that existing taxonomies do not support security across the
business modelling perspectives. In this contribution [Ahme 13], we propose a
comprehensive three-dimensional taxonomy of business process security. The tax-
onomy is subsequently used to classify security risk-oriented patterns and identify
their potential occurrences to deploy these security patterns in business processes.
4.1 Research Method
The overall research method (see Figure 4.1) of developing business process security
taxonomy consists of three steps. Initially, the survey of existing taxonomies and
architectures for security assessment and business process modelling is conducted
(i.e., Step 1 ). The goal is to identify the core concepts of both domains. The survey
gives two primary outcomes. Firstly, two aspects of business process modelling,
i.e., hierarchical abstraction and perspectives (see Section 4.2). Secondly, identify
security objective, security policy, security control and security requirement as
multifaceted attributes of security assessment in information system. On the basis
of these outcomes, a taxonomy of business process security is developed in Step 2
that defines the relations between the characteristics of both domains derived in
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prior step (see Section 4.2). Finally, the application of taxonomy is performed in
Step 3 using an example process. The application of taxonomy classifies security
risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 13]. Also, it illustrates how these patterns could be
applied in business process models.
Figure 4.1: Research method applied for developing the business process
security taxonomy
4.2 Taxonomy of Business Process Security
Security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 12a, Ahme 14b] overlap two domains, namely
business processes and security risk management, and comprehend three major
concepts of ISSRM domain model (see Section 3.3.1): i) security context to de-
fine organisation’s assets and their security criteria; ii) security problem describes
a risk, its impact and the attack method to exploit vulnerabilities and execute
threat; Also, iii) security solutions to solve the identified security problems by
defining one or more countermeasures applied to treat the risks. Classification
requires a common attribute of the pattern that exists in both domains (i.e., busi-
ness processes and security), otherwise the pattern would capture information that
belongs to a single domain. The organisational asset is identified as a common at-
tribute that exists in business process models and also drives security risk analysis
(see Section 2.2.1). In business process models, the organisation’s asset exists at
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one of the three hierarchical levels (described in Section 4.2.1) represented by one
of the four business perspectives (see Section 4.2.2). Finally, security criteria (see
Section 4.2.3) are defined as constraints on asset(s), in other words, they are con-
straints on the business perspectives. In order to present these details, proposed
taxonomy of business process security characterises three dimensions, illustrated
in Figure 4.2. The dimensions are conferring to the domains of business pro-
cesses and security. The first two dimensions (i.e., business process hierarchy and
business perspective) describe business processes. The third dimension addresses
security concerns within the prior two dimensions. In accordance with the three
concepts of the security pattern, the security context in a pattern characterises the
organisation’s assets and their security criteria. Therefore, we use security context
of a pattern to derive the following attributes: i) what (i.e., asset), ii) how (i.e.,
security criteria) to secure and iii) where (i.e., at which level in business models)
we can apply the security patterns. Next section briefly describes the granularity
of these dimensions.
Figure 4.2: Three dimensions of the business process security taxonomy
4.2.1 Business Process Hierarchy
As described in Section 2.1.1, hierarchical levels deal with the levels of business
process hierarchy and describe how the business performs based on the level of de-
tails provided in the business process diagrams. We have adopted the classification
performed by Weske [Wesk 12] and grouped the vertical hierarchy of a business
process model at the following three levels:
Enterprise comprises of value system and value chain. Value system char-
acterises the relationship of an organisation to its business environment. Each
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value system consists of a number of value chains, each of which is associated with
one organisation. Value chains organize the enterprise business functions and re-
late them to each other (as businesses cooperate with each other to achieve their
business goals), providing an understanding of how a company operates.
Operational business processes show the functional decomposition of the
value chain. The business functions are broken down to functions of smaller hier-
archy and ultimately, to activities of operational business processes. The leaf level
functions of the decomposition are called activities. After decomposition, execu-
tion constraints are introduced to relate activities to each other. The phenomenon
transforms the business functions to the operational business processes.
Activity implementation comprises of activity models and activity instances.
Activity models show the description of an activity expressed in di↵erent forms,
for instance, by plain text or by some formal specification or references to soft-
ware components that implement them. For example, a user-defined model that
lies at M1 layer of Meta Object Facility (MOF) [OMG 06] in OMG. The activ-
ity instances characterize the actual work conducted during business processes.
For example, Object diagram lies at M0 layer of MOF [OMG 06]. Furthermore,
each activity instance has di↵erent states i.e., init, enabled, ready, skip, running,
terminate and closed.
The dimension can describe a complex business process at di↵erent level using
dedicated constructs at each level. The relation between the process hierarchical
levels is aggregation meaning the levels are interrelated, where, the lower level
objects make it up to a higher level component [Krog 12]. In business process
models, business functions are merely used and according to [Mueh 05, Cope 10,
Vare 11, Khan 10] security risk is considered as an inherent part of business activ-
ity. Hence, in this thesis, we restricted our scope towards the business activities
and its decomposition (i.e., atomic activity).
4.2.2 Business Process Perspectives
The second dimension is derived from [Curt 92, Krog 12, Star 94]. It deals with
four modelling perspectives (i.e., functional, behavioral, organisational and infor-
mational) of a business process model, which represents business assets that a
business process can have. These perspectives also served as a foundation and
they are frequently used as classification of business process modelling. We have
used following business perspectives to classify business assets in a business process
model: i) Functional perspective represents activities that are being performed to
transform the input to an output. Functional perspective includes function, pro-
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cess, activity and task as process elements [Krog 12]. ii) Behavioral perspective
represents the states and transition between states. It includes the following con-
cepts of business process modelling language, state, event, condition and transition
[Krog 12]. It describes the execution order of activities (e.g., sequencing) and the
behavior how they are performed, i.e., loops, iteration, complex decision-making
conditions, entry and exit criteria. iii) Organisational perspective represents the
organisational unit, the role, the (individual) human, and the (automatic) re-
source, where and by whom the business activities are performed [Curt 92]. iv)
Informational perspective describes the informational entities produced or manip-
ulated by a process. These entities include data, artefacts, products (intermediate
and end), and objects; it includes both the structure of informational entities and
the relationships among them [Curt 92].
4.2.3 Security Criteria
In the taxonomy, this dimension represents security constraints on the assets.
Therefore, we adopted security objective to identify the security dimension. To be
consistent with security patterns, we use the CIA model [Info 91] that focusses on
confidentiality, integrity and availability (see Section 2.2.2). As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.2, there exists other security criteria (i.e., authorization, non-repudiation
and privacy) but they can be formulated by combining the basic three security
criteria used in this dimension.
4.3 Application of Business Process Security Tax-
onomy
The section demonstrates the application of business process security taxonomy.
The goal of this application is to classify security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 12a,
Ahme 14b] and to facilitate business analysts to apply these patterns in the busi-
ness process models. Now that a structural foundation is defined (i.e., taxonomy).
Next, both the security patterns and business process models should correspond
to it. Therefore, concrete steps are needed to classify both the security patterns
and business models such that they correspond to the propoed taxonomy. The
application process (depicted in Figure 4.3) of proposed taxonomy is divided into
three activities.
1. Classification of security patterns. The goal of this activity is to align
security patterns with the proposed taxonomy. Conferring to security context
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Figure 4.3: Application of security risk-oriented patterns using taxonomy
from security risk-oriented template [Ahme 11], in Step (i) Determine business
perspective, we determine asset (i.e., business perspective) that a particular pattern
secures. In Step ii) Identify security criteria identifies security constraint (i.e.,
security criteria) on asset. Then, we analyse the graphical representation of pattern
in Step (iii) Determine the process hierarchical level, to determine the hierarchical
level where the pattern can be applied. The concrete steps, illustrated in Figure
4.3, are defined in [Ahme 13] along with its application using an example. These
steps result in asset (from Step (i)) and hierarchical level (from Step (iii)) that
provide common foundation, which also exist in business process model. In later
activities, the information is matched to see if pattern is applicable in a particular
business process or not, if it is applicable then security information is added to
business process model (for details see [Ahme 13]).
2. Classification of business process models. The goal of this activity is
to align business process models with the two dimensions of taxonomy, namely
hierarchical levels and business perspectives. The idea is to characterise hierarchi-
cal levels of business process (Step (i)) to find, which level of details are given in
business process model. In Step (ii) we identify the business perspectives. The
activity results in hierarchical level (from Step i) of a business process model and
business asset(s) (from Step (ii)) that exists in this model. The output informa-
tion of this activity is used to verify if a business process model has a particular
asset that is secured by a particular security pattern. In [Ahme 13], we classify an
example of business process models to illustrate the execution of this activity.
3. Pattern implementation. It is the final activity in the application process.
The activity is carried out in two phases using a 4-step matching process as de-
scribed in Figure 4.3. The first phase takes output from above activities. This
phase ascertains that both the security pattern and operational business process
have the required preliminaries to apply the pattern and is attainable using hierar-
chical level matching and business perspective matching. The second phase focusses
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on finding the structural and semantic similarities between the elements of security
pattern and business process (or fragment of business process). After performing
a 4-step process, the results from each step are united to conclude if the security
patterns can be applied in a business process or not. In this regard, the output of
each step should approve that the pattern and a business process matches in their
hierarchical level (Step 1) and business perspective (Step 2). Additionally, if the
structure (Step 3) of the security pattern is similar to the elements or fragment of
a business process model and also their semantics are identical, then, the pattern
can be applied in a business process model. Otherwise, if any of the result from
the above four activities dissuade, then, the security pattern is not applicable in
the business process.
The objectives of proposed taxonomy are to classify security patterns and
specify their implementation in the business process model. In [Ahme 13], we
demonstrate how these objectives are achieved by applying the proposed taxon-
omy. During the application the steps in the first activity (i.e., Classification of
security patterns) is used to classify security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 14b].
The security patterns are classified on the basis of business asset (that they are
protecting), their security criteria and where it can be applied in the business pro-
cess model. Once the patterns are classified, next, we apply steps proposed in the
second activity (i.e., Classification of business process models) to classify an exam-
ple business process to identify business assets and their hierarchical level. This
activity helps to align the process with security patterns. Finally, the output from
these activities is matched in last activity (i.e., Pattern implementation). This
activity checks if the security patterns are applicable in business process models
(see details in [Ahme 13]).
4.4 Related Work
The notion of proposing taxonomy is not novel. The idea behind the taxonomy is
to gain an understanding of the characteristics and nature of a language or domain
(e.g., business processing modelling or security) to address the domain inadequacy
or deficiency.
There exists several approaches for classifying di↵erent aspects of business
process modelling as according to their needs. A framework [Agui 04] classifies
business process modelling techniques using two dimensions, namely purpose of
the model and change model permissiveness. In the first dimension, the business
process models are classified into four types based their purpose, i.e., learning,
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decision support for process development and their execution and control, support
for information technology. The second dimension change model permissiveness
characterises a model as active or passive models. The study focusses on tools
classification rather than the structural classification of business modelling lan-
guages. The study [Verg 08] classifies business process modelling techniques in
three sets. These sets comprised of diagrammatic models, formal/mathematical
models and executable models. The classification focusses on the structural char-
acteristics of a business process models and their capabilities specialised in the
context of analysis and optimisation. In [Rych 11], business process modelling
are classified in two categories, prescriptive processes (having have a predictable
sequences of activities) and descriptive processes (illustrate actor collaboration
and resource exchange with weak predictability of activity sequences). These cat-
egories are further distinguished as context-specific process that depends on the
context and configurable process that need to be customised in accordance with
the context. A conceptual framework [Mela 00] organises business processes in
four di↵erent views, deterministic machines, complex dynamic systems, interact-
ing feedback loops and social constructs. The primary focus is to understand and
view di↵erent aspects of an organisation using business process modelling. These
views overlap each other, and lack of formal distinction makes the classification less
favorable. A framework [Giag 01] proposes three dimensions to integrate a busi-
ness process modelling taxonomy and information systems modelling techniques.
Firstly, breadth deals with the goals and objectives of a modelling language. Sec-
ondly, depth considers the modelling perspectives of a language adopted from
[Curt 92]. Finally, fit illustrates the typical projects to which the technique can
be applied. The framework assists the decision makers in evaluating and selecting
suitable modelling techniques, depending on the characteristics and requirements
of individual projects. Another framework [Aitk 10] aligns various concepts and
representations of organisational actions within the context of business process
modelling. It uses a top-down approach to hierarchically define four levels, i.e.,
contextual, conceptual, logical and physical. The framework has two alternative
views, service oriented view deals with sequencing of actions, and function ori-
ented view focusses on their classification. The framework guides in defining the
scope of business concepts and their level of specificity in business process ar-
chitecture, but it does not distinctly represents the modelling perspectives (i.e.,
function, behavior, resource or data) of a process.
The study [Fire 04] provides an overview of concepts used in security and il-
lustrates their relationships to define security requirements. It describes security
into a hierarchical taxonomy as quality subfactor. The taxonomy is applicable
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to business process models at an abstract level as security is addressed as vul-
nerability in assets rather than describing as technical security solutions. The
taxonomy is similar to the security dimension proposed in this chapter, although
we have defined security objectives using CIA model [Info 91] and consider that
other security objectives can be aggregated from them. A thorough study [Igur 08]
examined the existing security-related taxonomies to see their e cacy in security
assessment. The study proposed a basic set of characteristics to develop a new
taxonomy for assessing security, which can be used as a framework to examine
new systems in identifying their vulnerabilities. The study reveals that an e -
cient method to organise attack information is using a hierarchical method starts
with the impact of an attack and move down to identify the vulnerabilities. The
approach mainly focuses on the classification of attacks rather on the security it-
self. Another notable survey [Hafi 06] highlights the problems of finding security
patterns and emphasises the necessity of scientific classification of security pat-
terns. The study claims the pattern searching would be better if multiple views
are incorporated in security patterns. In [Hafi 07], they classify patterns based
on security objectives using CIA model [Info 91], application context, threat type
using STRIDE model [Swid 04]. Moreover, they proposed a classification based
on a tree structure combined with the STRIDE model to join the software and
security view in terms of security patterns. Cheng et al. [Chen 03] classify secu-
rity patterns using the aspect types [Gamm 95] of the patterns (i.e., creational,
structural, or behavioral) and the abstraction level (network, host, or applica-
tion). The classification of security patterns in [Schu 05] is based on Zachman’s
framework for enterprise architecture [Zach 87, Sowa 92]. It is presented along two
dimensions. The vertical dimension illustrates the architectural views characteris-
ing these views on the interrogatives what, how, where, who, when, and why. The
horizontal dimension deals with the levels of information models, where the top
two layers cover the enterprise levels, and the bottom three address the system
levels. The security should be implemented all levels of models from enterprise
to technology; therefore, Schumacher et al. [Schu 05] introduce a new column to
include security view. They have classified the security patterns only listed in
their book. Their approach is similar to the one proposed in this chapter while
it is more specific for business process modelling. Therefore, the vertical dimen-
sion represents the business processes hierarchically, and the horizontal dimension
reflects the business perspectives and a new dimension is introduced to address
security. The above classification of security patterns [Hafi 07, Chen 03, Schu 05]
are mainly used to classify the security patterns that include technical details re-
lated to security controls while on the other hand our approach concerns with the
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specification of security requirements and is generic for business process modelling.
In [Ahme 13], we illustrate our concept using BPMN, though it can also be applied
to other business modelling languages.
4.5 Limitations and Future Work
In [Ahme 13], we have presented a taxonomy that integrates business process mod-
elling with the security criteria aimed to define a process-oriented classification
scheme for security risk-oriented patterns. The taxonomy focusses on applying
security patterns in business process models. Therefore, the current classifica-
tion is restricted to the patterns’ security context, which includes the attributes
assets (i.e., business perspective), its constraint (i.e., security criteria) and hi-
erarchical level of business process models. However, this classification scheme
has a limitation that it does not consider the security risk management concepts
(i.e., vulnerability, threat, attack method, risk and etc.), which can be a poten-
tial future work to extend this taxonomy. In proposed taxonomy, the security
dimension only deals with security objective specification, which does not fully
incorporate the requirement engineering perspectives to align the comprehensive
security specification (as mentioned in Section 2.2.2). Therefore, together with the
security objective specification, the security dimension requires specifying security
policy, security requirement, security control and their smooth translation, within
the business process hierarchy. This future work can be a valuable extension to
the proposed taxonomy in defining a universal business process security model
(e.g., ontology, meta-model). Another limitation of proposed taxonomy is the ap-
plication of security patterns, which is currently performed manually. However,
there are interesting approaches [Ekan 12, Dijk 11, Dong 08] presented in busi-
ness process community in the area of business process similarity that support the
structural and semantic similarity up to a certain extent, as in these o↵erings there
is the potential to automate or at least semi-automate the patterns’ application
process. Finally, we also acknowledge the need of validating the taxonomy in an






Security patterns facilitate business analysts in analysing security risks and pro-
vide a rationale for security requirements in a way that is understandable by
business analysts. Also, the taxonomy of business process security integrates se-
curity with business processes making the patterns’ application in business pro-
cess models. However, these contributions lack a systematic elicitation of secu-
rity requirements. Furthermore, requirements are described at a general level,
which needs to be expressed in more detail with respect to particular context
of an enterprise. To overcome these problems: firstly, security requirements de-
scribed in security patterns are refined, and security requirement model is gen-
erated from business process model (see [Matu 13]). Secondly, we proposed a
method –security requirements elicitation from business processes (SREBP)– to
elicit security objectives from business process models and translate them to secu-
rity requirements (see [Ahme 15]). We apply and validate SREBP method in the
Genome Centre case study. In the validation, we check the completeness and e -
ciency of SREBP method against security quality requirements engineering (a.k.a.,
SQUARE) method.
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Figure 5.1: SREBP – Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Pro-
cesses
5.1 Security Requirements Refinement
The idea behind the refinement of security requirement is to take the early require-
ments described in security risk-oriented patterns and generate the security model
from a business process models that represents the detailed security requirements
along with its context. In [Matu 13], we illustrate how early requirement check
for the access permissions, presented in SRP4 [Ahme 14b], is refined to the RBAC
security model. The approach is adopted in SREBP method (see Section 5.2)
to develop security models for others security patterns [Ahme 14b] to elicit their
detailed security requirements.
5.2 SREBP Method
The method is based on the domain model for information system security risk
management (ISSRM) [Dubo 10] and the security risk-oriented patterns [Ahme 14b].
The section briefly introduces SREBP method. A detailed application of SREBP
method is illustrated in [Ahme 15]. The method consists of two stages (as illus-
trated in Figure 5.1). Firstly, Stage 1: Business assets identification & security
objectives determination describes how to identify business assets and to deter-
mine their security objectives from the value chain and business process diagrams.
The identification of business assets and their security objectives is performed us-
ing the ISSRM domain model [Dubo 10] (for details see [Ahme 15]). Secondly,
Stage 2: Security requirements elicitation supports eliciting security requirements
from the operational business process within five contextual areas –access control,
communication channel, input interface, network infrastructure, and data store.
The contextual area of Access control is related to inter- and intra-organisational
concerns and specifies the access control policy where di↵erent roles perform oper-
ations and access data in the system, to change the state of protected asset. In the
case of Communication channel, one considers how data are exchanged or commu-
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nicated between business entities or stakeholders. In the case of Input interfaces,
one analyses how input data are treated before accepting them for processing. In
the case of Network infrastructure, one needs to protect the network infrastructure
connecting LIMS to an external or local networks used to perform business oper-
ations for their availability. Finally, the Datastore contextual area concerns data
protection when storing or/and retrieving to/from the datastore. It is important
to note that each artefact –data or process– separately considered and protected
at each contextual area, contributes to the security of business assets identified
at the first stage. The SREBP method uses security patterns to elicit security
requirements in order to protect the identified assets. In SREBP, the security
requirements are described in detail using security models (e.g., SecureUML and
UML) in each contextual area. The requirements contribute to the achievement
of one or more security criteria, i.e., confidentiality and integrity of data, integrity
and availability of business activity. A single pattern may be associated to mul-
tiple security criteria; thus, one security requirement could potentially contribute
in accomplishing more than one security criteria.
5.3 Security models
In SREBP method, security models are generated from the contextual area ex-
cept for input interfaces. The idea is to analyse security for identified assets in
detail because the respective security models (e.g., RBAC model) have dedicated
constructs to explore the scenario. It leads to three major benefits: firstly, such
security analysis would not be possible in business process modelling languages
due to lack of dedicated constructs because the primary objective is to represent
the enterprise’s business process. Secondly, due to these independent representa-
tions of security models, the business process models are not overwhelmed with the
security related details that have no primary use for a business analyst. Finally,
the security models ease the implementation of security requirements, for instance
there exists several mechanism to implement RBAC model. These security models
are derived from a particular context (e.g., access control, communication channel
and etc.) within a certain scenario (e.g., Genome Centre in [Ahme 15]). Therefore,
the security models cannot be reused in any other scenario; however, the security
patterns are defined in a general way, which can be reused in di↵erent scenarios.
The proposed taxonomy [Ahme 13] discusses di↵erent abstractions of busi-
ness processes (i.e., enterprise level, operational business process and activity im-
plementation). However, currently the thesis addresses security at operational
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business processes particularly the enterprise’s activities whose execution is sup-
ported by their information system or its architecture. It also includes individuals
and business partners coordinating with these activities at this level. Therefore,
SREBP method relies on the information captured in the business process mod-
els. During SREBP application in [Ahme 15], we assume that the business process
models completely represent the scenarios necessary for their LIMS. Hence, any




SREBP method is validated in the case study of Estonian Genome Centre. The
advantages of using case study methodology are described in [Ahme 15]. We have
adopted a holistic case study approach [Yin 09] where the case Genome Centre
is studied as a single unit. The case study design (see Figure. 5.2) consists of
three major activities, out of which the first activity (i.e., SREBP Application)
illustrates the application of SREBP method details are provided in [Ahme 15],
while the second activity corresponds to the application of SQUARE method (see
Appendix I in [Ahme 15]). SQUARE method is used to validate proposed method
by comparing the results from the application of both methods. The activity uses
a comparison criteria (described in [Ahme 15]) to measure the completeness and
e ciency of both methods. For this purpose, the activity input the resulting
security requirements from the application of both methods.
5.4.2 Execution
The Genome Centre had already modelled their operational business processes,
which served as input to the case study. The operational business processes in-
clude the enterprise’s activities whose execution is supported by the information
system or its architecture [Wesk 12]. They also highlight individuals and busi-
ness partners coordinating with the enterprise’s information system to achieve the
business goals of the enterprise. Both methods are applied by a team of two per-
sons (first and third author of [Ahme 15], having di↵erent expertise, security and
business respectively) over the period of five weeks. Once the application is com-
pleted, we proceed to verify the elicited security requirements. The verification
was carried out in two meetings with the domain expert, each of about 2 hours.
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During these meetings the security requirements were verified in terms of their
relevance to the system-to-be, i.e., LIMS, which is then followed by small revi-
sions to few requirements. Next, the requirements elicited from both methods are
categorised according to eight generic categories adopted from the existing litera-
ture [ITSE 91, Fire 03b, Schu 05]. These generic categories belong to the security
domain that classify the application of security in an information system. The
idea is to compare the completeness of these methods by reducing the comparison
complexity by classifying the security requirements from both methods at a more
granular level (i.e., each category) [Bail 96, Smit 81] (for details see [Ahme 15]).
Figure 5.2: Validation process of SREBP method
Validation results consisting all the identified business assets of Genome Centre
are presented in [Ahme 15]. The results show that SREBP method reaches a
coverage of almost 80% of completeness in addressing security for the Genome
Centre business assets whereas coverage of SQUARE is close to 44%. Similarly,
application of SQUARE method took 17 person-hours more than that of SREBP
method. Thus, SREBP is 27% more e cient (79/62=1,27, i.e., 27%) as compared
to SQUARE. The results conclude that SREBP method is better suited in eliciting
security requirements from business process models. The SREBP method enables
early security analysis and allows business analysts not only to understand how to
protect secure business assets, but also contributes to the alignment of business
process models with the technology that supports the secure execution of business
processes. The validity of case study results (presented in [Ahme 15]) may be
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a↵ected by few threats. We have discussed these threats in detail (see [Ahme 15]),
particularly regarding reliability, construct validity and external validity.
To reduce the learning e↵ects, first we performed the SREBP application.
Therefore, the carry-over e↵ects to perform SREBP application in less time is
avoided because the participants are not familiar with the operational business
processes. Whereas SQUARE application is e↵ected by the carry-over e↵ects be-
cause participants became familiar. Similarly, during the verification of security
requirements, SREBP requirements are verified first to avoid the carry-over e↵ects
of performance. Because the domain expert spent time to understand the ratio-
nale for these requirements, whereas in SQUARE application the domain expert
become aware of the security rationale and is performed relatively quick.
5.5 Related Work
Fabian et al. [Fabi 10] conducted a thorough study comparing the security re-
quirements engineering methods and organized them into several categories. We
have compared few of them with the SREBP method:
Multilateral approaches, such as Multilateral Security Requirements Analy-
sis (MSRA) method [Gurs 06] and Security Quality Requirements Engineering
(SQUARE) method [Mead 06] consider security requirements of all stakeholders
and resolve conflicting security requirements from di↵erent stakeholders [Gurs 06].
MSRA analyses security needs for system-to-be, identify conflicting interests and
security goals, and develop di↵erent stakeholder views. SQUARE facilitates the
collaboration between the requirement engineers and stakeholders. MSRA and
SQUARE, both methods use CIA [ITSE 91] in defining the security goals. SREBP
method considers the security needs of other stakeholders particularly in access
control context. However, only in the interest of information systems and ex-
empt the security goals that are solely in the interest of other stakeholders, i.e.,
business partners. Currently, SREBP method focuses on security requirements
elicitation without examining the conflicting security requirements between the
system’s business partners.
UML based approaches like Misuse cases [Sind 05], SecureUML [Lodd 02], and
UMLsec [Jurj 05] focus on system design. Misuse cases represent unwanted be-
havior of the system-to-be. They are complemented with template that include
details regarding security threats analysis. SecureUML is suitable to express role-
based access control policies for distributed systems. UMLsec uses di↵erent UML
diagrams to represent the requirements with the help of UML profile (i.e., stereo-
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types, constraints, and tagged values). Like UML approaches, SREBP method
uses security risk-oriented extensions [Altu 12, Altu 13] for business process mod-
elling languages. These languages illustrate the security requirements graphically
together with its rationale. Additionally, SecureUML and UML interaction dia-
grams are used to define the security models for SREBP’s contextual areas, i.e.,
access control, communication channel, network infrastructure and datastore.
Goal-oriented approaches, such as Knowledge Acquisition in Automated Spec-
ification (KAOS) [Lams 07], Secure i* [Elah 07], Secure Tropos [Mour 07], and
Goal-Based Requirements Analysis Method (GBRAM) [Anto 01] facilitate the re-
quirements elicitation and specification by providing the rationale for a particular
requirement [Yu 98]. The introduction of goal analysis and specification remove
ambiguity and conflicts from the requirements, bring transparency and traceabil-
ity to the requirements specification. KAOS helps one to analyse requirements,
their conflicts, and model anti-models to elicit security requirements. KAOS is tar-
geted towards the completeness, consistency, and feasibility of requirements along
with their specifications. Secure Tropos and Secure i* deal with the whole system
development process, but strongly focus on the early development steps. Sim-
ilarly, GBRAM utilizes the goal and scenario-driven requirements to formulate
privacy and security policies, but with a focus on the confidentiality. In busi-
ness process modelling, there exists constructs to model the organisational aspects
of enterprise especially focuses on the interaction of enterprise and stakeholders
[Ahme 13]. SREBP utilises these features to elicit the security objectives from
the value chain that are later considered and refined to security requirements.
This hierarchical abstraction of business process modelling leads to trace these
requirements to their origins naturally.
Security in business processes is integrated with several ways; security
objective elicitation, security requirements specification/modelling, security risk-
driven approaches and security requirements conformance checking. Majority of
these practices correspond partially to the overall business security or applicable
to a certain extent. A model-driven approach [Wolt 09] expresses security goals
at the business process level. A generic security model specifies security goals,
policies, and constraints based on a set of fundamental entities, such as objects,
attributes, interactions, and e↵ects. They further discuss a translation of security
annotated business processes into security configurations. Similarly, a framework
[Herr 06] distinguishes the business process elements and expresses the standard
security requirements in 14 detailed security requirements. The security require-
ment are presented through the symbols mapped to business process elements.
These approaches focus on the description of abstract security goals, and their
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mapping to the technical specification to ensure that security constraints are not
violated. However, they neither define any graphical notation for specifying se-
curity goals or security requirements in business process models nor explain the
systematic elicitation of security goals or requirements. Therefore, the approaches
will work fine if the business analysts already aware of their security goals.
In addition to keep the business rules consistent by introducing security mech-
anisms, [Rohr 04, Mona 12] provide means to express the security requirements
in business process models. In [Rohr 04] a formal descriptive language is used to
derive security requirements that assign security level to business process com-
ponents. The levels are then checked for consistency, and security measures are
derived using a configurable rule-base that maps security objectives to their con-
trols. Similarly, a tool-supported framework [Mona 12] extends the modelling and
execution of business processes to support the specification, execution and moni-
toring of the security and safety constraints protecting the business assets. These
studies [Rohr 04, Mona 12] only provide means to express the security require-
ments in business process models.
Several approaches, [Menz 09, Rodr 07, Pavl 08, Mull 11], focus on the graph-
ical aspects of security requirements and proposed extensions for business process
modelling language to represent the security requirements graphically. Menzel
et al. [Menz 09] proposed a model-driven approach by extending the security
elements for business process modelling to describe security requirements. This
allows evaluating enterprise assets, describe trust and later translating them to se-
curity controls for service-based systems. Rodŕıguez et al. [Rodr 07] also extended
BPMN using padlocks to annotate business processes with security requirements.
The early security requirements are expressed with a particular padlock symbols.
Similarly, Christopher and Joe [Pavl 08] proposed two new artefacts –operating
condition and control case– to express the constraints on business processes. Mod-
elling constraints helps in mitigating risk and facilitate the early discovery of se-
curity requirements. Mülle et al. [Mull 11] proposed an annotation language em-
bedded to express security requirements as structured text annotations in business
process models. The annotation language covers the requirements from authoriza-
tion, authentication, auditing, confidentiality, integrity, and security-, privacy- and
trust-related user involvements. These approaches facilitate graphical aspects of
security requirements and neglect the elicitation of security requirements. Further-
more, the approaches do not take into consideration the rationale for the security
requirements.
A Model-driven framework [Vare 11] extend the meta-model of business pro-
cess models to perform a risk assessment in di↵erent stages of modelling, from
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a high abstraction level to an executable level. The framework performs an au-
tomatic checking to confirm if business process models conforms to the required
security objectives.
Paja et al. [Paja 12] specify social commitments by analysing the participant’s
objectives and their interactions, which are considered as the high-level specifica-
tion of security requirements. Security requirements are annotated in BPMN using
conversation and choreography diagrams. Though it gives the rationale for secu-
rity, but the requirements are limited to the exchange of resources. Moreover, a
detail semantic mapping between organisational model and BPMN is also missing.
5.6 Limitations and Future work
Currently, SREBP method only deals with the intentional or deliberate security
risks. In the future, we plan to extend the notion of security concept adopted
to incorporate the security-risks related to unintentional or accidental harm to
the information systems in SREBP. The new security concept would align the
SREBP method with the comprehensive security specification defined in [Maye 09,
Dubo 10]. Similarly, the security objectives are defined in terms of the CIA model
[ITSE 91], other security objectives [Scan 08] (e.g., authorization, non-repudiation
and privacy) are also a subject to change. Another limitation of SREBP method
is that it does not perform the valuation of assets, likelihood analysis of potential
vulnerabilities and their impact analysis. Such analysis would help in assessing
the value for the likelihood and the possible consequences of identified risks. Thus,
we propose a future work to strengthen SREBP method with the technique inte-
grated with the business processes that performs the likelihood analysis of potential
vulnerabilities and their impact analysis. Currently, SREBP method generates se-
curity models manually from the business process model; an automated approach
is needed in the future to trace and apply changes in security models when the
respective business process models are modified. Additionally, SREBP method
does not prioritise the security requirements; a technique is needed to facilitate
business analysts to decide, which security requirements should be implemented




The overarching goal of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of exactly
how security engineering can be aligned with business processes to elicit security
requirements for an information system. For this purpose, we believe that we have
provided more insight into the domains by considering two important aspects
of security in business processes, namely the systematic elicitation of security
requirements keeping their rationale intact on the one hand, and their graphical
representation on the other hand.
In particular, the thesis has proposed three complementary contributions:
Firstly, security risk-oriented patterns (in Chapter 3) that integrate the security
risk analysis into business process models. The contribution includes a structured
specification (i.e., security risk-oriented template), and a modelling language that
supports security risk concepts in business process models that business analysts
can understand easily. Secondly, the taxonomy for assessing security in business
processes (in Chapter 4) that integrates security in business processes domain. The
taxonomy classifies the proposed security risk-oriented patterns and identifies their
potential occurrences to deploy these patterns in business process models. Finally,
a method, security requirements elicitation from business processes (SREBP) (in
Chapter 5), is developed. The method allows early security analysis by deter-
mining the security objectives from business process models and their systematic
translation to security requirements. The method uses the domain model of in-
formation system security risk management and security patterns. The elicited
security requirements are then described in detail using the system’s contextual
areas.
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These contributions work together to support the security requirements elici-
tation from business processes, where i) the identification of business assets and
determination of security objectives are carried out from the enterprise’s organi-
sational business processes. Moreover, ii) the elicitation of security requirements
are performed on the operational business processes using contextual areas. The
usefulness of the first contribution has been validated through the industrial cases.
The second contribution is validated using a constructed example. The third con-
tribution is validated using a case study to check its completeness and e ciency in
eliciting security requirements and how it contributes in securing business assets
against security quality requirements engineering (SQUARE) method.
Future work
In this thesis, we have aimed at a systematic approach for eliciting security re-
quirements from business processes. The thesis bridges the gap between business
process modelling and security domains using security patterns. Nevertheless,
the contributions and limitations of the thesis highlight that substantial further
research can be conducted in this area. In particular, we identify the following
future works:
• The current set of security patterns is not complete. Therefore, we need to
extend the current set of security patterns. The new security patterns would
not only cover additional risks and vulnerabilities within the current scope,
but also broaden the notion of security (defined in [Maye 09, Dubo 10]) to
include more variety of security-risks and vulnerabilities. In addition, this
will cover the unintentional or accidental harm to the information systems.
• Current approach is missing the in-depth assessment of assets, risks, and
vulnerabilities. The work conducted in this thesis can be complemented with
the in-depth assessment that includes assets’ valuation, likelihood analysis
of potential vulnerabilities and threats along with their impact analysis. On
the basis of these assessments, security requirements can be prioritised to
facilitate business analysts in selecting necessary security requirements. The
prioritization can include cost measurement to support the security trade-o↵
analysis in case of limited time, resources, or finances.
• The taxonomy only covers the specification of security objective in the se-
curity dimension; the scope of the security dimension can be extended to
include security policy, security requirement, and security control. The ex-
81
tension can fully incorporate the requirement engineering perspectives to
cover the security specification comprehensively.
• As demonstrated in this thesis, currently all the activities are performed
manually. Therefore, a software tool support is needed to manage security
patterns. The tool integration with existing knowledge bases (digitally avail-
able catalogue of vulnerabilities, risks or other security-related concepts) can
keep the patterns up-to-date and improves the patterns’ productivity. More-
over, the tool can help in finding the structural and semantic similarity up
to a certain extent, to automate or at least semi-automate the application
of security patterns in business process models and to generate the respec-
tive security models. Furthermore, it can help to guarantee the traceability
between these models when di↵erent steps are performed in SREBP method.
82
References
[Acco 13] R. Accorsi. Security in Business Process Management. it –
Information Technology, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 215–216, 2013. 17
[Agui 04] R. S. Aguilar-Savén. Business process modelling: Review
and framework. International Journal of Production Economics,
Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 129 – 149, 2004. 63
[Ahme 11] N. Ahmed and R. Matulevičius. A Template of Security
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Security Requirements from the Business Process Models.
In: Proceedings of the CAiSE’2014 Forum, pp. 57–64, 2014. 21
83
[Ahme 14b] N. Ahmed and R. Matulevičius. Securing Business Processes
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and A. H. M. Hofstede. Approximate Clone Detection in
Repositories of Business Process Models. In: Business Process
Management, pp. 302–318, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. 66
87
[Elah 07] G. Elahi and E. Yu. A Goal Oriented Approach for Model-
ing and Analyzing Security Trade-O↵s. In: Conceptual Mod-
eling - ER 2007, pp. 375–390, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 38,
73
[ENIS 04] ENISA –Inventory of Risk Assessment and Risk Manage-
ment Methods. 2004. 29
[ENV 95] ENV 12 204, Advanced Manufacturing Technology – Sys-
tems Architecture– constructs for Enterprise Modelling.
Tech. Rep., 1995. 19, 25
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Seoses ettevõtetes infosüsteemide poolt toetatud tegevuste osakaalu pideva
kasvamisega on viimastel aastatel pidevalt kasvanud firmades ka äriprotsesside
modelleerimise kasutamine. Paralleelselt on üha enam hakatud teadvustama va-
jadust turvapoliitikate väljattamise ja rakendamise järele. Tänapäevases dünaami-
lises keskkonnas on turvalisuse roll palju enamat kui pelgalt äritegevuse jätkusuu-
tlikkuse tagamine ettevõtte varade kaitsmise läbi – mõnede autorite väitel on tur-
valisus lausa äritegevust edasiviiv jõud. Ettevõtte turvalisust puudutavate va-
jaduste tuvastamine ning nendele vastavate nõuete spetsifitseerimine on keeruline
ettevõtte infosüsteemide ja äriprotsesside käitamise tiheda seotuse tõttu. Veelgi
enam, turvaanalüüs nõuab ekspertteadmisi nii infosüsteemide kui ka äriprotsesside
vallas.
Olemasolev kirjandus turvalisuse vallas piirdub peamiselt äriprotsessides kas
turvakontseptsioonide graafilise esitamisega turvaanalüüsis või turvapiirangute jõus-
tamisega. Katmata on turvavajaduste ilmutamine ja nende automaatne teisendamine
loodava süsteemi turvanõueteks. Samas, äriprotsesside modelleerimise kaudu on
võimalik juba täna väljendada ettevõtete organisatsioonkäitumist (nt. äriväärtused
ja sidusgruppide huvid). See on kasutamata potentsiaal ettevõtete turvavajaduste
kaardistamiseks varajase turvaanalüüsi käigus uute süsteemide nõuete spetsifit-
seerimisel ärianalüütikute poolt. Seetttu pakub käesolev töö välja meetodi tur-
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vanõuete äriprotsessidest ilmutamiseks selliselt, et ärianalüütikud saavad aru tur-
valisust puudutavatest vajadustest ja on seeläbi võimelised defineerima süsteemide
turvanõudeid vastavalt vajadusele.
Selle dissertatsiooni panused on järgnevad. Esmalt (Peatükk 3) arendatakse
välja turvariskidele orienteeritud mustrid, mis võimaldavad süsteemselt integreerida
turvanõudeid äriprotsessidesse. Selleks uuritakse algselt kattuvusi turvatehnika ja
äriprotsesside modelleerimise vahel. Uurimise tulemusena joondatakse äriprot-
sesside modelleerimise keele konstruktsioonid turvavaldkonna põhimõistetega ja
identifitseeritakse äriprotsesside modelleerimise keele puudujäägid turvariskidega
seotud mõistete esitamise seisukohast. Joondus tagab põhjendatud ja peenekoelise
argumentatsiooni äriprotsesside modelleerimise keele laiendamiseks tuvastatud pu-
udujääkide käsitlemisel. Vastavaid laiendusi kasutatakse turvariskidele suunatud
mustrites ärivarade ja nende turvakriteeriumite, potentsiaalsete turvariskide ja
vastumeetmete esitamiseks. Turvariskidele suunatud mustrid kirjeldavad, kuidas
ühendada turvanõuded äriprotsesside mudelitega. Üldiselt eeldab turvatehnika
tihedat koostööd ärianalüütiku (konkreetset ärivaldkonda tundev spetsialist) ja
turvaanalüütiku (turvavaldkonna spetsialist) vahel. Kuigi eksperdid oma ärivald-
konnas, on ärianalüütikutel piiratud või puudub üldse teadmine turvatehnikast.
Nad peavad usaldama parimaid turvapraktikaid, infoturbe standardeid või tur-
vaeksperte. Sellise olukorra parendamiseks pakutakse käesolevas töös välja tur-
variskidele suunatud mustrite kasutamine. Selle lahenduse intuitsiooniks on empii-
riline teadmus, et enamike probleemide lahendamiseks ei ole tihti vaja uusi lahen-
dusi ja piisab olemasolevate taaskasutamisest või kohendamisest. Turvariskidele
suunatud mustrite kasutuselevõtuga vähendame me ärianalüütikute vajadust tur-
vaanalüütikute abi järele, kuna mustrid kätkevad endas nii turvanõudeid kui nende
põhjendust. Mustrite kasulikkust uurime läbi nende rakendamise kahes ärijuhtu-
mis.
Teiseks (Peatükk 4), arvestades, et mustrite arv saab kasvada, siis nende ra-
kendamise lihtsustamiseks on tähtis mustrite klassifitseerimine. Selleks pakume
välja äriprotsesside turvalisuse taksonoomia, mis defineerib protsessipõhise klas-
sifitseerimise skeemi turvariskidele suunatud mustrite jaoks. Väljapakutud tak-
sonoomia iseloomustab kolme dimensiooni, mis on omased äriprotsesside model-
leerimisele ja turvalisusele. Esimesed kaks dimensiooni (äriprotsesside hierarhia
ja äriline perspektiiv) kirjeldavad äriprotsesse. Esimene dimensioon ”äriprotses-
side hierarhia” kirjeldab kuidas äri toimib vastavalt äriprotsesside diagrammide
detailsuse tasemele. Teine dimensioon ”äriline perspektiiv” käsitleb äriprotsesside
mudelite nelja perspektiivi (funktsionaalne, käitumuslik, organisatsiooniline ja in-
formatiivne) modelleerimist, mis esitavad ärivarasid äriprotsesside diagrammidel.
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Kolmas dimension esitab varade turvakitsendusi, mis käsitlevad eelneva kahe di-
mensiooniga seotud turvalisuse teemasid. Taksonoomia eesmärgiks on äriprot-
sesside modelleerimise ühendamine turvariskidega. Lisaks, taksonoomia määrab
mustrite potentsiaalse esinemise äriprotsessides ja lihtsustab mustrite rakendamist.
Taksonoomia rakendamist demonstreerime illustreeriva näite baasil.
Lõpetuseks (Peatükk 5) formuleerime ülalkirjeldatud panuste baasil SREBP
(Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes) meetodi, mis on käes-
oleva töö peamine panus. Arendatud meetod võimaldab varajast turvaanalüüsi
tuvastades äriprotsesside mudelitest turvaeesmärgid ning tõlkides need süsteem-
selt turvanõueteks. Meetod baseerub infosüsteemide turvariskide haldamise vald-
konnamudelil (information system security risk management (ISSRM)) ja tur-
variskidele suunatud mustritel. Meetod koosneb kahest etapist. Etapp 1, äri-
varade ja turvaeesmärkide tuvastamine, kirjeldab kuidas tuvastada ärivarasid ja
nende turvaeesmärke väärtusahelast ja äriprotsesside diagrammidest. Ärivarade ja
nende turvaeesmärkide identifitseerimisel rakendatakse ISSRM valdkonnamudelit.
Etapp 2, turvanõuete ilmutamine, toetab turvanõuete ilmutamist operatiivsetest
äriprotsessidest viies kontekstis ligipääsukontroll, suhtluskanal, sisendliides, võrgu
infrastruktuur ja andmehoidla. SREBP meetod kasutab turvariskidele suunatud
mustreid ilmutamaks turvanõudeid. SREBP-s on turvanõuded kirjeldatud de-
tailselt kasutades turvamudeleid (nt. SecureUML ja UML) igas nimetatud kon-
tekstis. Turvamudelid võimaldavad põhjalikult analüüsida konkreetsete varade
turvalisust kuna neis (nt. RBAC) on vastavad konstruktsioonid eri stsenaari-
umite vaatlemiseks. SREBP meetodi valideerime Eesti Geenivaramu juhtumi-
uuringu raames. Valideerimisel kontrollitakse SREBP täielikkust ja efektiivsust
turvanõuete ilmutamise võimekuse võtmes.
Need panused üheskoos toetavad turvanõuete ilmutamist äriprotsesside mu-
delitest, kus i) ärivarade tuvastamine ja turvaeesmärkide tuvastamine teostatakse
ettevõtte äriprotsesside põhjal ja ii) turvanõuete ilmutamine teostatakse käiguso-
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7 Altuhhova, O., Matulevičius, R., Ahmed, N. (2013). An Extension of Busi-
ness Process Model and Notation for Security Risk Management. International
Journal of Information System Modeling and Design (IJISMD), 4(4), 93-113.
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